Late last week, the Governing Committee of the Fund for Orderly Bank Restructuring (FROB) met to discuss the restructuring of Caja de Ahorros y Monte de Piedad de Cordoba (CajaSur).

The judgment of the Commercial Court in WASA and AGF v Lexington shows that a “follow settlements” clause in a reinsurance contract will not obviate the need for the reinsured to demonstrate that an inwards settlement falls within the terms and conditions of its outwards reinsurance. Partner Michael Mendelowitz reviews the judgment.

There are unique and competing interests between the United States Bankruptcy Code1 and federal and state environmental laws. One of the primary purposes of the Bankruptcy Code is to allow a debtor to have a "fresh start." On the other hand, environmental laws are intended to require responsible parties to comply with environmental standards for the protection of human health and the environment. As a result of these competing interests, there has been extensive litigation related to the interplay between the bankruptcy and environmental regimes.

Overview

In Asarco, LLC v. Noranda Mining, Inc., the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that representations made to the bankruptcy court that the Debtor’s settlement of environmental claims reflected only the Debtor’s share of the cleanup costs did not judicially estop the Debtor from brining a contribution claim against another potentially responsible party for those same costs.

In chapter 11 reorganizations, Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 3003(c)(3) provides that “[t]he court shall fix and for cause shown may extend the time within which proofs of claim or interest may be filed” (commonly known as the bar date). For a creditor or interest holder to be subject to this bar date, they must have received notice to satisfy due process. A known creditor, one that is reasonably ascertainable, must receive “actual notice.” Simply receiving a court-approved bar date notice from the debtor is enough to satisfy this requirement for due process.

A. United States v. Delfasco, Inc., 409 B.R. 704 (D. Del. July 15, 2009).

This suit involved a motion to withdraw from Bankruptcy Court to District Court. Defendant/Debtor Delfasco, Inc. (“Delfasco”) filed for Chapter 11 protection under the Bankruptcy Code following the EPA’s issuance of a RCRA Order requiring Delfasco to install and maintain mitigation systems for trichloroethylene that it discovered on its property. The United States, on behalf of the EPA, filed an Adversary Complaint against Delfasco, followed by this motion to withdraw.  

Last week the Supreme Court exercised its option to do nothing about a Seventh Circuit decision allowing the federal government to cram a $150 million remediation obligation onto a chapter 11 successor corporation – all because the feds chose to proceed under RCRA (the federal hazardous waste statute) rather than CERCLA (the Superfund cleanup statute). Smart tactics by the feds.

When a company that has been designated a responsible party for environmental cleanup costs files for bankruptcy protection, the ramifications of the filing are not limited to a determination of whether the remediation costs are dischargeable claims. Another important issue is the circumstances under which contribution claims asserted by parties coliable with the debtor will be allowed or disallowed in the bankruptcy case. This question was the subject of rulings handed down early in 2011 by the New York bankruptcy court presiding over the chapter 11 cases of Lyondell Chemical Co.

When a company saddled with potential environmental liabilities seeks bankruptcy protection, the goals of Chapter 11—giving the reorganized debtor a “fresh start” and fairly treating similarly situated creditors—can conflict with the goals of environmental laws, such as ensuring that the “polluter pays.” Courts have long struggled to reconcile this tension.

After five years of litigation, on 3 April 2014, the US Department of Justice entered into a settlement agreement with Kerr-McGee Corporation and its parent company, Anadarko Petroleum (“Kerr-McGee”). This agreement requires Kerr-McGee to pay $5.15 billion in order to compensate for its environmental and tort liabilities of the past 85 years.

This agreement came after the 12 December 2013 judgment of the US Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York in Tronox Inc., et al., v. Kerr-McGee Corp., et al. (In re Tronox Inc.), 503 B.R. 239 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013).