In Short

The Situation: The U.S. Supreme Court considered whether § 363(m) of the Bankruptcy Code, which limits a party's ability to undo an asset transfer made to a good-faith purchaser in a bankruptcy case, is jurisdictional.

On April 24, 2023, the First Circuit’s opinion in Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Coughlin came up for oral argument before the Supreme Court. At issue in this appeal is whether this provision’s “abrogat[ion]” of sovereign immunity “as to a governmental unit,” defined to include any “other … domestic government” in section 101(27), embodies a congressional intention to revoke the sovereign immunity of a Native American tribe with sufficient and obvious clarity to be construed as such a revocation.

It’s a defense v. offense distinction:

• Defense—An objection and counterclaim designed to diminish or zero-out a proof of claim in bankruptcy is not subject to arbitration; but
• Offense—An objection or counterclaim designed to do anything more . . . can be compelled to arbitrate.

That’s the essence of a recent opinion in Johnson v. S.A.I.L. LLC (In re Johnson), Adv. No. 22 -172, Northern Illinois Bankruptcy Court (issued March 28, 2023; Doc. 18). What follows is a summary of that opinion.

Facts

On April 19, 2023, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in MOAC Mall Holdings LLC v. Transform Holdco LLC, in which the Court considered whether 11 U.S.C. § 363(m) is jurisdictional. A unanimous Court held that § 363(m) is not jurisdictional, determining that the language of the statute “takes as a given the exercise of judicial power over any authorization under § 363(b) or § 363(c).” This determination is based upon the requirement that for a statutory precondition to be jurisdictional, Congress must clearly state the intent.

On April 19, 2023, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously held in MOAC Mall Holdings LLC v. Transform Holdco LLC that Section 363(m) of the Bankruptcy Code is not jurisdictional. The decision requires parties timely to invoke that provision, or else risk forfeiting its protections. The decision also continues the Supreme Court’s trend of interpreting statutes to be non-jurisdictional (and thus waivable or forfeitable) in the absence of a clear congressional statement to the contrary.

Background

In MOAC Mall Holdings v. Transform Holdco, the Supreme Court of the United States addressed whether Section 363(m) of the Bankruptcy Code―which limits the effect of certain appeals on orders authorizing the sale or lease of bankruptcy estate property―is a jurisdictional provision.

On April 19, 2023, the Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion written by Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson in MOAC Mall Holdings LLC, ruled Bankruptcy Code section 363(m) to be non-jurisdictional, i.e. just a “mere restriction on the effects of a valid exercise” of judicial power “when a party successfully appeals a covered authorization.” Before MOAC, the Third, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits held section 363(m) to be non-jurisdictional, but the Fifth and Second Circuits had diverged.

Reasoning

On April 19, 2023, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its opinion inMOAC Mall Holdings LLC v. Transform Holdco LLC, 598 U.S. (2023), reversing the Second Circuit decision and determining that the limitations on appeals of bankruptcy sale orders provided in section 363(m) of the Bankruptcy Code are not jurisdictional. Rather section 363(m) merely provides a "caveated constraint" on the appellant’s remedies on such appeals.

In a departure from prior precedent in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (SDNY), a recent opinion by Judge Michael E. Wiles in In re Cortlandt Liquidating LLC,[1] effectively lowered the Bankruptcy Code section 502(b)(6) cap on rejection damages that a commercial real estate landlord may claim, by holding that the cap should be calculated using the “Time Approach,” rather than the “Rent Approach.”

Calculation of Lease Rejection Damages

The Second Circuit recently held that a non-party to an assumed executory contract is not entitled to a cure payment (although it may be so entitled if is a third-party beneficiary of the contract). The result would have seemed obvious to bankruptcy practitioners. So, what in the world made the party pursuing payment take this to the Second Circuit? Well, surprisingly, as the Second Circuit decision shows, the answer is not found in the plain text of the Bankruptcy Code. And while it was argued prior to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Bartenwerfer v. Buckley, No. 21-908, 598 U.S.