Welcome to the latest issue of the Section 337 Update. This newsletter is designed to provide you with practical updates and developments on Section 337 proceedings before the US International Trade Commission.
The Collision of Section 337 and the US Bankruptcy Laws
What should be the remedy when a bankruptcy court holds that a security interest is avoidable as a preferential transfer, but the value of the security interest is not readily ascertainable? The Ninth Circuit recently addressed this issue in USAA Federal Savings Bank v. Thacker (In re: Taylors), 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 5793 (9th Cir. 2010). The Court held that, since the value of the security interest was not readily ascertainable, the only available remedy is for the bankruptcy court to return the security interest itself, not its value, to the bankruptcy estate.
The Third Circuit recently held that a bankruptcy court may confirm a Chapter 11 plan that includes a sale of assets in which secured creditors are not permitted to “credit bid” for the assets. In re Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298 (3d Cir. 2010). In that case, the debtors in possession, companies that own and operate the Philadelphia Inquirer and Philadelphia Daily News, moved the bankruptcy court to approve bid procedures for an auction of the debtors’ assets. Id. at 302.
On June 2, 2010, the Third Circuit overruled longstanding precedent interpreting the definition of a “claim” under the Bankruptcy Code. In JELD-WEN, Inc. v. Van Brunt (In re Grossman’s Inc.), No. 09-1563, slip op., (3d Cir. June 2, 2010) an en banc panel rejected the state law accrual theory of claims recognition established in Avellino & Bienes v. M. Frenville Co. (Matter of M. Frenville Co.), 744 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1984), in favor of the more widely followed conduct test theory.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit on June 2, 2010, sitting en banc, overruled its own precedential holding in Avellino & Beines v. M. Frenville Co. (Frenville), 744 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1984), to hold that in the context of asbestos-related tort claims, a “claim” under the Bankruptcy Code arises when an individual is exposed pre-petition to a product giving rise to an injury rather than when the injury manifests itself. JED-WEN, Inc. v. Van Brunt (In re Grossman’s), No. 1563, slip op. at 18 (3d Cir. June 2, 2010).
Merger and acquisition transactions frequently have included ongoing obligations of the parties to each other. In a recent decision by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, a trademark licensee in a 1991 acquisition survived an effort by the bankrupt licensor to overturn the license. (In re: Exide Technologies, U.S. Third Circuit Court of Appeals, No. 08-1872 filed June 2, 2010) The case illustrates that the time in which agreements in a merger and acquisition transaction remain at issue can be longer than would be expected.
Reversing both the bankruptcy court and the district court, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that a trademark licensing agreement had been substantially performed and was therefore not subject to rejection under §365(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. In re Exide Technologies, Case No. 08-1872 (3d Cir., June 1, 2010) (Roth, J.) (Ambro, J., concurring).
In the case of In re: Exide Technologies, decided on June 1, 2010, the US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed two lower court decisions and held that a 1991 agreement between Exide Technologies and EnerSys Delaware Inc., which included a license to EnerSys for use of the “EXIDE” trademark, is not an executory contract that can be rejected by Exide in bankruptcy proceedings.
In a significant development for financial institution directors and officers, the Federal Deposition Insurance Corporation (FDIC) has filed the first lawsuit in the current financial crisis against former officers of a closed financial institution arising from alleged loan losses to the bank. On July 2, 2010, the FDIC filed a complaint in federal court in California against former officers of the homebuilding division of IndyMac Bank for civil money damages. FDIC v. Van Dellen, Case No. 2:10-cv-04915-DSF-SH (C.D. Cal.) (July 2, 2010).