Last week, our post “You Can’t Always Get What You Want” discussed a Texas bankruptcy court decision rejecting efforts by debtor Sam Wyly to claim as exempt a number of offshore private annuities.

Professional compensation is often a contentious issue in bankruptcy, as we have previously discussed.

A debtor’s exclusive right to formulate and solicit acceptances for a plan of reorganization during the initial stages of a chapter 11 case is one of the most important benefits conferred under the Bankruptcy Code as a means of facilitating the successful restructuring of an ailing enterprise. By giving a chapter 11 debtor-in-possession time to devise a solution to balance sheet and operational problems without being burdened by the competing agendas of other stakeholders in the bankruptcy case, exclusivity levels the playing field, at least temporarily.

Postconfirmation liquidation and litigation trusts have become an important mechanism in a chapter 11 bankruptcy estate’s arsenal, allowing for the resolution of claims and interests without needlessly delaying confirmation in the interim. The specter of postconfirmation litigation may seem unremarkable. Section 1123(b)(3)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code states that a plan may provide for retention or enforcement by the reorganized debtor, the trustee, or a representative of the estate of any claim or interest belonging to the estate.

One of the primary fights underlying assumption of an unexpired lease or executory contract has long been over whether any debtor breaches under the agreement are “curable.” Before the 2005 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, courts were split over whether historic nonmonetary breaches (such as a failure to maintain cash reserves or prescribed hours of operation) undermined a debtor’s ability to assume the lease or contract.

The ability to sell an asset in bankruptcy free and clear of liens and any other competing “interest” is a well-recognized tool available to a trustee or chapter 11 debtor in possession (“DIP”). Whether the category of “interests” encompassed by that power extends to potential successor liability claims, however, has been the subject of considerable debate in the courts. A New York bankruptcy court recently addressed this controversial issue in Olson v. Frederico (In re Grumman Olson Indus., Inc.), 445 B.R. 243(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011).

Section 503(b) of the Bankruptcy Code delineates categories of claims that are entitled to elevated priority as “administrative expenses.” Under section 503(b)(3)(D), administrative expenses include “actual, necessary expenses” incurred by a creditor, indenture trustee, equity holder, or unofficial committee “in making a substantial contribution” in a chapter 11 case.

Over the past five years, courts have issued rulings of potential concern to buyers of distressed debt. Courts have addressed, among other things, “loan to own” acquisition strategies resulting in vote designation; equitable subordination, disallowance, and other lender liability exposure based upon the claim seller’s misconduct; disclosure requirements for ad hoc committees of debtholders; the adequacy of standardized claims-trading agreements; and claim-filing requirements in the era of computerized records.

Ever since the establishment of the U.K. Pensions Regulator (the "Regulator") by the U.K. Pensions Act 2004 (the "Act"), the Regulator's exercise of its authority has been of major importance to the U.K.'s restructuring and rescue business. The first judicial review of the Regulator's powers, however, hints that some of the procedures it has adopted may be curbed in the future.

The Pensions Regulator and the Restructuring Environment

When a bankruptcy court calculates the "projected disposable income" in a repayment plan proposed by an above-median-income chapter 13 debtor, the court may "account for changes in the debtor's income or expenses that are known or virtually certain at the time of confirmation," the U.S. Supreme Court held in Hamilton v. Lanning on June 7. Writing for the 8-1 majority, Justice Samuel A.