Professional compensation is often a contentious issue in bankruptcy, as we have previously discussed.

The ability to sell an asset in bankruptcy free and clear of liens and any other competing “interest” is a well-recognized tool available to a trustee or chapter 11 debtor in possession (“DIP”). Whether the category of “interests” encompassed by that power extends to potential successor liability claims, however, has been the subject of considerable debate in the courts. A New York bankruptcy court recently addressed this controversial issue in Olson v. Frederico (In re Grumman Olson Indus., Inc.), 445 B.R. 243(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011).

Section 503(b) of the Bankruptcy Code delineates categories of claims that are entitled to elevated priority as “administrative expenses.” Under section 503(b)(3)(D), administrative expenses include “actual, necessary expenses” incurred by a creditor, indenture trustee, equity holder, or unofficial committee “in making a substantial contribution” in a chapter 11 case.

Over the past five years, courts have issued rulings of potential concern to buyers of distressed debt. Courts have addressed, among other things, “loan to own” acquisition strategies resulting in vote designation; equitable subordination, disallowance, and other lender liability exposure based upon the claim seller’s misconduct; disclosure requirements for ad hoc committees of debtholders; the adequacy of standardized claims-trading agreements; and claim-filing requirements in the era of computerized records.

Ever since the establishment of the U.K. Pensions Regulator (the "Regulator") by the U.K. Pensions Act 2004 (the "Act"), the Regulator's exercise of its authority has been of major importance to the U.K.'s restructuring and rescue business. The first judicial review of the Regulator's powers, however, hints that some of the procedures it has adopted may be curbed in the future.

The Pensions Regulator and the Restructuring Environment

When a bankruptcy court calculates the "projected disposable income" in a repayment plan proposed by an above-median-income chapter 13 debtor, the court may "account for changes in the debtor's income or expenses that are known or virtually certain at the time of confirmation," the U.S. Supreme Court held in Hamilton v. Lanning on June 7. Writing for the 8-1 majority, Justice Samuel A.

As a general rule, absent an express agreement to the contrary, expenses associated with administering the bankruptcy estate, including pledged assets, are not chargeable to a secured creditor’s collateral or claim but must be paid out of the estate’s unencumbered assets. Recognizing, however, that the bankruptcy estate may be called upon to bear significant expense in connection with preserving or disposing of encumbered assets as part of an overall reorganization (or liquidation) strategy, U.S.

The ability of a chapter 11 debtor-in-possession (“DIP”) or bankruptcy trustee to assume or reject unexpired leases or contracts that are “executory” as of the bankruptcy filing date is one of the most important entitlements created by the Bankruptcy Code. It allows a DIP to rid itself of onerous contracts and to preserve contracts that can either benefit its reorganized business or be assigned to generate value for the bankruptcy estate and/or fund distributions to creditors under a chapter 11 plan.

One of the hallmarks of chapter 11, and bankruptcy jurisprudence in general in the U.S., is the fundamental right of creditors and other stakeholders to have a meaningful voice in the proceedings concerning matters that affect their economic interests.

The power to alter the relative priority of claims due to the misconduct of one creditor that causes injury to others is an important tool in the array of remedies available to a bankruptcy court in exercising its broad equitable powers. However, unlike provisions in the Bankruptcy Code that expressly authorize a bankruptcy trustee or chapter 11 debtor-in-possession (“DIP ”) to seek the imposition of equitable remedies, such as lien or transfer avoidance, the statutory authority for equitable subordination—section 510(c)—does not specify exactly who may seek subordination of a claim.