(W.D. Ky. July 7, 2016)
We at The Bankruptcy Cave applaud the recent ruling by Judge Whipple of the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Ohio, seeking to make the post-confirmation parties, processes, and procedures far more transparent. In In re Affordable Med Scrubs, LLC,[1] Judge Whipple declined to approve a disclosure statement for a debtor’s liquidating plan.
The purpose of filing for Chapter 7 bankruptcy is to discharge debts. But even after obtaining a discharge, a debtor is not totally in the clear. A recent case in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Michigan involves an adversary proceeding in which the United States Trustee sought to revoke a Chapter 7 debtor’s (the “Debtor”) discharge.[i]
In an earlier blog piece we reported on the Third Circuit’s 2015 decision in In re Jevic Holding Corp. where the Court approved a settlement, implemented through a structured dismissal, which allowed junior creditors to receive a distribution prior to senior creditors being paid in full.
What happens to funds held by a Chapter 13 trustee (the “Trustee”) in the event that a Chapter 13 debtor dismisses her case voluntarily? That’s the question that was addressed by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Michigan (the “Court”) in a recent opinion.1
In this case, the Chapter 13 debtor (the “Debtor”) owned a residence with significant equity. The Court confirmed a plan pursuant to which the Debtor would retain her residence and make monthly payments to the Trustee in the amount of $8,500.75 for 60 months.
Earlier this month, Judge Sontchi dismissed an intercreditor adversary complaint filed in 2014 by the Energy Future Holdings (“EFH”) first-lien trustee against the second-lien noteholders. At issue in this decision, Delaware Trust Co. v. Computershare Trust Co.
The power of a debtor or trustee to avoid preferential transfers that benefit certain creditors over others is critical to achieving one of the primary tenets of the Bankruptcy Code – the equality of treatment among all creditors. This ability to recover preferences prevents a debtor from favoring certain creditors over others by transferring property in the time leading up to a bankruptcy filing. Although these preference powers are broad, they are restrained by certain conditions, including a minimum threshold on amounts that can be avoided.
A typical bond indenture provides that prior to the incurrence of an event of default, a trustee’s obligations are limited to those specifically set forth in the indenture. It is only following the occurrence of an event of default that the trustee’s duties of prudent conduct seem to ripen. This often leaves trustees and bondholders in a state of uncertainty over what actions, if any, a trustee may be obligated to take as the financial condition of an issuer worsens but has not yet crossed the default line. A recent case from the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Becker v.
So you are chugging along with a foreclosure action (either on real and/or personal property) only to be stopped in your tracks by the borrower filing a voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. The usual, immediate thought is – “better contact our bankruptcy counsel to obtain relief from the automatic stay.” Well, perhaps, or perhaps you might want to contact the Chapter 7 Trustee first (either directly or through your bankruptcy counsel). Why? Maybe the Chapter 7 Trustee would be interested in liquidating that collateral for you though the bankruptcy system.
The Pension Protection Fund (“PPF”) has updated its approach to employer restructuring guidance and its general guidance for restructuring and insolvency professionals. These documents set out certain criteria that should be met when making proposals to the PPF in respect of a sponsoring employer suffering an insolvency event.
1. The PPF Approach to Employer Restructuring: