The United States Supreme Court recently ruled in Stern v. Marshall1 that a bankruptcy court lacks constitutional authority to render a final judgment on a bankruptcy estate’s counterclaim against a creditor based on state common law, despite an express statutory grant of jurisdiction. This ruling is the most significant decision regarding bankruptcy court jurisdiction since the Court’s 1982 decision in Northern Pipeline v. Marathon2 and it could significantly affect the administration of bankruptcy cases.
Root of the Constitutional Problem
In the well-publicized opinion of In re Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC et al., 599 F. 3d 298 (3rd Cir. 2010), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, agreeing with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,1 held that Section 1129(b)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code (the Code)2 is unambiguous and is to be read in the disjunctive, thus allowing a proponent of a Chapter 11 plan of reorganization to use the "cram down" power under subsection (iii) of that Section without allowing a secured creditor to credit bid on a sale proposed as part of the plan.
On April 12, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) released a blog post titled “Busting myths about bankruptcy and private student loans.” In the blog post, the CFPB argues that certain private education loans can be discharged in bankruptcy. Specifically, the CFPB argues that the following private student loans can be discharged without a showing of undue hardship and an adversary proceeding:
On June 22, 2020, FERC issued a declaratory order confirming its view that it shares jurisdiction with the United States Bankruptcy Court (“Bankruptcy Court”) over transportation agreements between ETC Tiger Pipeline, LLC (“ETC Tiger”) and Chesapeake Energy Marketing L.L.C. (“Chesapeake”). As a result, aside from obtaining approval from the Bankruptcy Court to reject its contracts with ETC Tiger, Chesapeake must seek a determination from FERC as to whether a filed rate may be modified or abrogated under the Natural Gas Act (“NGA”).
On January 27, 2020, FERC petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (“Sixth Circuit”) for rehearing en banc of that court’s decision finding bankruptcy court-FERC concurrent jurisdiction over certain power purchase agreements. Notwithstanding such concurrent jurisdiction, the Sixth Circuit’s decision finds that the bankruptcy court’s concurrent jurisdiction is paramount, and that therefore, FERC-jurisdictional power purchase agreements are susceptible to rejection in bankruptcy.
On April 29, New Jersey’s governor signed into law bill A4997, known as the Mortgage Servicers Licensing Act. As the title indicates, the Act creates a licensing regime for servicers of residential mortgage loans secured by real property within New Jersey. As with many state licensing regimes, the Act exempts most banks and credit unions from licensing.
On August 20, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of Illinois in In re I80 Equipment, LLC, No.17-81749, 2018 WL 4006294 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. Aug. 20, 2018) held that a secured party failed to perfect its security interest due to an insufficient description of the collateral listed in its UCC-1 financing statement. The financing statement failed to sufficiently describe the collateral because it referenced the definition of “collateral” in the underlying security agreement without attaching the security agreement to the financing statement.
In re: Linear Electric Co., Inc., No. 16-1477, 2017 U.S. App. Lexis 5527 (3d Cir., March 30, 2017)
While section 503(b)(9) claims deserve priority payment over general unsecured claims, they do not provide a basis for stripping a debtor’s defenses in determining the allowed amount of a section 503(b)(9) claim.
Note: Pepper Hamilton LLP serves as co-counsel to the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (the Committee) in the ADI case. The views expressed herein are solely those of the authors and not of the Committee.