Rogan v. U.S. Bank, N.A. (In re Partin), 517 B.R. 770 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 2014) –
A chapter 7 trustee sought to avoid mortgages on three properties using his “strong arm” powers, arguing that they were improperly recorded and thus did not provide constructive notice to a purchaser or lien creditor.
After an oversecured creditor obtained relief from the automatic stay and foreclosed on some property, the bankruptcy court asserted jurisdiction over disposition of the sale proceeds and denied in part the creditor’s claim for fees. The district court reversed and the case was appealed to the 5thCircuit.
In re 2408 W. Kennedy, LLC, 512 B.R. 708 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2014) –
A commercial landlord sought relief from the automatic stay so that it could complete prepetition eviction proceedings against the debtor. The debtor objected, arguing that it had a right to assume the lease. The case turned on whether the landlord effectively terminated the lease prepetition.
The trustee of a liquidating trust under a general contractor’s confirmed chapter 11 plan tried to recover pre-petition payments made to a subcontractor as either a preference or a fraudulent conveyance. The court’s decision turned on whether the payments were trust funds under the Illinois Mechanics Lien Act.
The United States Supreme Court recently ruled in Stern v. Marshall1 that a bankruptcy court lacks constitutional authority to render a final judgment on a bankruptcy estate’s counterclaim against a creditor based on state common law, despite an express statutory grant of jurisdiction. This ruling is the most significant decision regarding bankruptcy court jurisdiction since the Court’s 1982 decision in Northern Pipeline v. Marathon2 and it could significantly affect the administration of bankruptcy cases.
Root of the Constitutional Problem
In the well-publicized opinion of In re Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC et al., 599 F. 3d 298 (3rd Cir. 2010), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, agreeing with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,1 held that Section 1129(b)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code (the Code)2 is unambiguous and is to be read in the disjunctive, thus allowing a proponent of a Chapter 11 plan of reorganization to use the "cram down" power under subsection (iii) of that Section without allowing a secured creditor to credit bid on a sale proposed as part of the plan.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals recently issued an opinion that potentially broadens the proximate cause element of claims brought under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). RICO’s proximate cause element requires a plaintiff to allege facts plausibly establishing that there is a “direct relationship” between the claimed injury and the defendant’s conduct in violation of RICO.
Client Alert
On May 7, 2020, New York Gov. Andrew Cuomo enacted Executive Order No. 202.28, which extended and expanded — but in some cases narrowed — the temporary suspension of several New York state laws due to the COVID-19 crisis. The Executive Order impacts many industries and individuals in New York state, including both commercial and residential landlords and tenants.