Wright v. Owens Corning, 450 B.R. 541 (W.D. Pa. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 2012 WL 1759992 (3rd Cir. Pa.) (May 18, 2012).

In re Heritage Highgate, 679 F.3d 132 (3d Cir. 2012)

CASE SNAPSHOT

In In re Interstate Bakeries Corporation, ___ F.3d ___ (8th Cir. 2012) (IBC), the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that a perpetual, royalty-free trademark license was an executory contract and therefore subject to assumption or rejection by a bankruptcy debtor. This decision is at odds with a recent decision from the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, In re Exide Technologies, 607 F.3d 957 (3d Cir. 2010), which found that such a license under similar circumstances was not an executory contract and could thus not be assumed or rejected by the bankruptcy debtor.

Affirming the bankruptcy and district courts below, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, in In re Federal-Mogul Global Inc., 684 F.3d 355 (3d Cir. 2012), held that a debtor could assign insurance policies to an asbestos trust established under section 524(g) of the Bankruptcy Code, notwithstanding anti-assignment provisions in the policies and applicable state law.

Asbestos Trusts in Bankruptcy

In 1984, the Third Circuit was the first court of appeals to examine the Bankruptcy Code’s new definition of “claim” in Avellino & Bienes v. M. Frenville Co. (In re M. Frenville Co.), 744 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1984). Focusing on the “right to payment” language in that definition, the court decided that a claim arises when a claimant’s right to payment accrues under applicable nonbankruptcy law. This “accrual” test was widely criticized by other circuit courts as contradicting the broad definition of “claim” envisioned by Congress and the Bankruptcy Code.

Before soliciting votes on its bankruptcy plan, a chapter 11 debtor that has filed for bankruptcy typically must obtain court approval of its disclosure statement. As part of the disclosure-statement approval process, interested parties are afforded the opportunity to object. For example, a party may object on the grounds that the disclosure statement lacks sufficient information about the debtor. Sometimes, however, a party objects to the disclosure statement because the chapter 11 plan described by the statement cannot be confirmed.

On July 25, 2012, the Third Circuit issued its decision in In re American Capital Equipment LLC and Skinner Engine Co., 688 F.3d 145 (3rd Cir. 2012), becoming the first circuit court to align itself with numerous district courts that have allowed bankruptcy courts to reject a Chapter 11 plan prior to a confirmation hearing.

First and foremost here at the Drug and Device Law Blog, we like good, strong defense decisions.  If those decisions contain lessons (or reminders) for our everyday practice – so much the better.  That’s why we’ve blogged about cases that let us remind you to check publicly available information about plaintiffs, make sure the plaintiff was alive when she filed suit, and search bankruptcy filings to see if plaintiff disclosed her lawsuit.  We

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently reiterated its position that the doctrine of equitable mootness should only apply if granting relief on appeal would undermine a consummated bankruptcy plan. In In re Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC, the Third Circuit held that the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania abused its discretion when summarily finding that the appeal at issue was equitably moot simply because the appellants failed to seek a stay and the debtors’ plan had been substantially consummated.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit took a bite out of a bagel store’s bankruptcy petition by holding that sales taxes are non-dischargeable “trust fund” taxes rather than excise taxes. In Re: Michael Calabrese, Jr., No. 11-3793 (3d. Cir. July 20, 2012). After not having enough dough to pay their debts, Don’s What a Bagel, Inc. and its individual owner both filed for bankruptcy protection.