A bankruptcy trustee or a debtor in possession has powers under the Bankruptcy Code to avoid certain transfers the debtor may have made prior to the petition date, including preferential and fraudulent transfers.
On September 22, 2017, the First Circuit Court of Appeals held that § 1109(b) of the Bankruptcy Code (the “Code”) provides a creditors’ committee with an “unconditional right to intervene” in an adversary proceeding.[1] In reaching this conclusion, the court reversed the District Court for the District of Puerto Rico’s order denying an intervention motion and distinguished its own precedent, on which the District Court had relied. This decision further bolsters the right of creditors’ com
If you are a licensee under a trademark license, what happens to your license if the licensor winds up in the Bankruptcy Court? A recent United States Circuit Court case demonstrates how uncertain the answer is at this time.
Some bankruptcy basics
In Crystallex Int'l Corp. v. Petróleos de Venez., S.A., Nos. 16-4012, 17-1439, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 95 (3d Cir. Jan. 3, 2018), the U.S. Court of Appeals held there could be no fraudulent transfer liability under the Delaware Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (“DUFTA”) where the transfer was made by a non-debtor entity—even where the debtor exercised complete control over the non-debtor and allegedly orchestrated transfers through the non-debtor to frustrate creditors.
On November 7, 2017, a panel of the Third Circuit, in an unreported decision, upheld the District Court’s determination that intended loss equaled the amount of concealed assets in a bankruptcy fraud case in which creditors were paid in full. U.S. v. Free, 2017 WL 5664671 (3d Cir. – Nov. 7, 2017). Significantly, Free filed for reorganization under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code, but he disclosed assets that exceeded his debts by several hundred thousand dollars.
On November 28, 2017, Tidewater Inc. and its affiliated debtors (collectively, the “Tidewater Debtors”) withdrew their motion objecting to final allowance of rejection damage claims of Fifth Third Equipment Finance Company (“Fifth Third”). The notice of withdrawal indicated that Fifth Third, the sole remaining non-settling vessel lessor, resolved its dispute with the Tidewater Debtors pursuant to which Fifth Third’s “Sale Leaseback Claim” was allowed in the amount of $67,500,000.
In deciding whether to afford administrative priority to claims arising from goods shipped shortly before a debtor’s bankruptcy filing, the Third Circuit, in In re World Imports Ltd., 862 F.3d 338 (3d Cir. July 10, 2017), interpreted the term “received” under section 503(b)(9) to mean “physical possession.” In effect, the Third Circuit’s decision provides additional protection to trade vendors that conduct business with distressed debtors.
In Varela v. AE Liquidation, Inc. (In re AE Liquidation, Inc.), 866 F.3d 515 (3d Cir. 2017), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit became the sixth circuit court of appeals to rule that a "probability standard" applies in determining whether an employer is relieved from giving 60 days’ advance notice to employees of a mass layoff under the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act of 1988 (the "WARN Act").
The Bottom Line
The Third Circuit recently held, in Schepis v. Burtch (In re Pursuit Capital Management, LLC), No. 16-3953, 2017 WL 4783009 (3d Cir. Oct. 24, 2017), that under section 363(m) of the Bankruptcy Code, if a party does not seek a stay pending appeal of a sale order, it is highly likely that any appeal of such sale will be determined statutorily moot. That was certainly the case here.
What Happened?
Background
On October 20, 2017, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued a decision which, among other things,[1] affirmed the lower courts’ holding that certain noteholders were not entitled to payment of a make-whole premium. The Second Circuit held that the make-whole premium only was due in the case of an optional redemption, and not in the case of an acceleration brought about by a bankruptcy filing.