“Reasonably equivalent value” as a defense to a fraudulent transfer suit “can be satisfied with evidence that the transferee (1) fully performed under a lawful, arm’s-length contract for fair market value, (2) provided consideration that had objective value at the time of the transaction, and (3) made the exchange in the ordinary course of the transferee’s business,” held the Supreme Court of Texas on April 1, 2016, in response to a certified question from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Janvey v. Golf Channel, ___ S.W.3d ___, 2016 WL 1268188, at *2 (Tex.

Is market value sufficient proof of reasonably equivalent value for purposes of the good-faith-for-value defense under Texas law? The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit certified that question to the Texas Supreme Court on June 30, 2015, after vacating its earlier decision in Janvey v. The Golf Channel, Inc., 2015 WL 3972216, at *3 (5th Cir. June 30, 2015).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, on Oct. 22, 2012, held that $1.6 million in political contributions made to five different political committees by Ponzi scheme defendants between 2000 and 2008 were fraudulent transfers made “with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors” under the Texas version of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. Janvey v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, Inc., et al., 2012 WL 5207460 ___ F.3d ___ (5th Cir. 2012).

“[L]ack of good faith in a SIPA [Securities Investor Protection Act] liquidation applies an inquiry notice, not willful blindness, standard, and that a SIPA trustee does not bear the burden of pleading the transferee’s lack of good faith,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on Aug. 30, 2021. In re Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC, 2021 WL 3854761, 91 (2d Cir. Aug. 30, 2021) (“Madoff”).

“A … transferee [who] received fraudulent transfers with actual knowledge or inquiry notice of fraud or insolvency” loses any “good faith” defense available under the Texas version of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (“TUFTA”), held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on Jan. 9, 2019. Janvey v. GMAG LLC, 2019 WL 141107, *3 (5th Cir. Jan. 9, 2019) (emphasis added).

Bankruptcy courts appear to be increasingly sending state law claims to the district court for final review, as illustrated by a recent decision from the bankruptcy court for the Southern District of Texas. In Gomez v. Lone Star National Bank (In re Saenz), Jose Gomez financed his acquisition of a restaurant from Humberto Saenz. When the restaurant failed, Gomez sued his lender and Saenz on various claims, but Saenz filed for bankruptcy protection. The lender then moved for summary judgment against Gomez’s claims for common-law fraud and negligence.

On Friday, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency closed The La Coste National Bank , headquartered in La Coste, Texas, and the FDIC was named receiver.

On March 8, 2016, Judge Shelly Chapman, presiding over the Chapter 11 cases of Sabine Oil & Gas Corporation and its affiliates ("Sabine"), granted Sabine's motion to reject certain midstream agreements between Sabine and Nordheim Eagle Ford Gathering ("Nordheim") and between Sabine and HPIP Gonzales Holdings, LLC ("HPIP"). Although the ruling as a procedural matter determined only whether rejection of the agreements was justified under section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code, the Court's analysis of the agreements under Texas law presaged a subsequent ruling on the nature of the agreements.

Advances in production technology have led to an unprecedented supply of natural gas in the United States, putting downward pressure on market prices. Both the Henry Hub cash price and the NYMEX price closed below $2.00/MMBtu at times in the past month and prices continue to hover in the $2.00 range.

The Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas dismissed the National Rifle Association’s (“NRA”) bankruptcy case on May 11, finding that the case was not filed in good faith. In his opinion, Judge Harlin Hale found that there was cause for dismissal because the case was filed “to gain unfair litigation advantage and … to avoid a state regulatory scheme,” neither of which he considered to be a purpose intended or sanctioned by the Bankruptcy Code.