The issue of whether gathering agreements are subject to rejection in bankruptcy as executory contracts and whether certain provisions of those agreements run with the land and survive rejection will impact ongoing bankruptcy proceedings of producers, as well as renegotiations of existing gathering agreements.

Background

Like many other Ponzi schemes, R. Allen Stanford’s operated by selling Certificates of Deposit and paying an initial group of victims a high return using subsequent investors’ money, all the while taking large portions of the investment funds for himself and his various entities (the “Stanford Entities”). While the Ponzi scheme’s perpetrator and many of his associates were sentenced to prison, hundreds of civil suits were filed in various courts that related to and stemmed from the Stanford Ponzi scheme.

“Reasonably equivalent value” as a defense to a fraudulent transfer suit “can be satisfied with evidence that the transferee (1) fully performed under a lawful, arm’s-length contract for fair market value, (2) provided consideration that had objective value at the time of the transaction, and (3) made the exchange in the ordinary course of the transferee’s business,” held the Supreme Court of Texas on April 1, 2016, in response to a certified question from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Janvey v. Golf Channel, ___ S.W.3d ___, 2016 WL 1268188, at *2 (Tex.

Creditors seeking to exercise control over a borrower or collateral may utilize a number of remedies. They may seek a foreclosure or UCC sale, assignment for the benefit of creditors, file an involuntary bankruptcy petition under Section 303 of the Bankruptcy Code (if they hold unsecured claims),[1] or, seek the appointment of a receiver.

1 PGDOCS\6505199.2 2015 Georgia Corporation and Business Organization Case Law Developments Michael P. Carey Bryan Cave LLP Fourteenth Floor 1201 West Peachtree Street, N.W. Atlanta, GA 30309 (404) 572-6600 March 22, 2016 This paper is not intended as legal advice for any specific person or circumstance, but rather a general treatment of the topics discussed. The views and opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author only and not Bryan Cave LLP. The author would like to thank Tom Richey for his continued support, advice and assistance with this paper.

This is the first of several posts on gathering agreements in bankruptcy, covenants running with the land and rejection claims that arise when a debtor finds gathering agreements financially burdensome. As our readers know, we waited with much anticipation for theSabine ruling and wait with equal anticipation for the ruling on similar issues in QuickSilver.  Being pragmatic business lawyers we decided to blog on what parties to gathering agreements should be doing now in light of the non-binding, advisory Sabine ruling.

U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Shelley Chapman ruled last week in the chapter 11 case of Sabine Oil & Gas that Sabine could utilize the U.S.

On March 8, 2016, Judge Shelly Chapman, presiding over the Chapter 11 cases of Sabine Oil & Gas Corporation and its affiliates ("Sabine"), granted Sabine's motion to reject certain midstream agreements between Sabine and Nordheim Eagle Ford Gathering ("Nordheim") and between Sabine and HPIP Gonzales Holdings, LLC ("HPIP"). Although the ruling as a procedural matter determined only whether rejection of the agreements was justified under section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code, the Court's analysis of the agreements under Texas law presaged a subsequent ruling on the nature of the agreements.

“You should try the chicken fried steak.  It’s like a chicken and a steak got together and made a baby. A delicious, crispy baby.”

– Hoyt Fortenberry, True Blood

Shore Chan Depumpo LLP v. Thrasher

Dallas Court of Appeals, No. 05-14-0697-CV (January 13, 2016)

Justices Fillmore, Stoddart (Opinion), and O’Neill