On December 15, 2010, Judge James Peck of the US Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (the Bankruptcy Court) approved Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc.’s (LBSF) motion (the Motion) for approval of a settlement among LBSF, BNY Corporate Trustee Services Limited (BNY), Perpetual Trustee Company Limited (Perpetual) and others relating to certain note issuance and swap transactions with Saphir Finance Public Limited Company (Saphir) under a program known as the Dante Program.
In the July/August 2010 edition of the Business Restructuring Review, we reported on an important ruling handed down by bankruptcy judge James M. Peck in the Lehman Brothers chapter 11 cases addressing the interaction between the Bankruptcy Code’s general setoff rules (set forth in section 553) and the Code’s safe harbors for financial contracts (found principally in sections 555, 556, and 559 through 562). In In re Lehman Bros. Holdings, Inc., 433 B.R. 101 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
On April 26, 2011, the Supreme Court of the United States adopted a completely revamped version of Rule 2019 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure to govern disclosure requirements for groups and committees that consist of or represent multiple creditors or equity security holders, as well as lawyers and other entities that represent multiple creditors or equity security holders, acting in concert to advance common interests in a chapter 9 or chapter 11 bankruptcy case.
On April 26, 2011, the Supreme Court approved a number of amendments to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. In particular, the Supreme Court amended Bankruptcy Rule 2019 to clarify the disclosure required of certain parties in interest in a chapter 9 or 11 bankruptcy case.1 These amendments were drafted by a panel of bankruptcy judges and restructuring experts and are intended to resolve a split in decisions concerning the proper application of the current Bankruptcy Rule 2019.
On April 26, 2011, the Supreme Court of the United States adopted amended Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 2019 (“Rule 2019”). Rule 2019 governs disclosure requirements for groups and committees that consist of or represent multiple creditors or equity security holders, as well as lawyers and other entities that represent multiple creditors or equity security holders, acting in concert in a chapter 9 or chapter 11 bankruptcy case.
The International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc. (“ISDA”) is preparing forms of amendment to its boilerplate master agreements in connection with market practice relating to the suspension of payments by a non-defaulting party. ISDA is also considering a protocol to implement the amendments into existing agreements on a multilateral basis.
In a decision entirely consistent with its ruling in the “Perpetual” adversary proceeding last year, on May 12, 2011, the United States Bankruptcy Court in the Lehman chapter 11 cases endorsed a strict interpretation of certain Bankruptcy Code provisions to the benefit of Lehman, which will result in Lehman having more leverage in its negotiations with derivatives counterparties. See Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc. v. Ballyrock ABS CDO 2007-1 Limited and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., Trustee, Adv. Proc. 09-01032 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 12, 2011).
Thus far in 2011, six additional states have enacted the provisions from the National Association of Insurance Commissioners’ Insurer Receivership Model Act (“IRMA”) that govern the treatment of “qualified financial contracts” and “netting agreements.”
The IRMA provisions, which are modelled on the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, allow a party that has entered into a swap transaction with an insurer to exercise certain netting, collateral realization and termination rights without being precluded by the automatic stay that is imposed if the insurer becomes insolvent.
In two recent decisions, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York has interpreted narrowly certain of the Bankruptcy Code’s safe harbor provisions.
In Lehman Brothers Special Financing, Inc. v. Ballyrock ABS CDO 2007-1 Limited (In re Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc.), Adv. P. No. 09-01032 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 12, 2011) [hereinafter “Ballyrock”], the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York held that a contractual provision that subordinates the priority of a termination payment owing under a credit default swap (CDS) to a debtor in bankruptcy, and which caps the amount of the termination payment, may be an unenforceable ipso facto clause under section 541(c)(1)(B).