The US Bankruptcy Court has issued a declaratory judgment that the relevant clause flipping priority from the swap counterparty to the noteholders constituted an ipso facto provision and was therefore unenforceable – a judgment that produces a different result under US law to that established by the Court of Appeal in the Perpetual Trustee case from November 2009.

Last week the Court of Appeal of England and Wales handed down its decision in four appeals which raise a number of questions of construction in relation to derivatives in the form of interest rate swaps and forward freight agreements documented under the International Swaps and Derivatives Association Inc. Master Agreement (the “ISDA Master Agreement”).¹ In particular, the decision focuses on the interpretation of section 2(a)(iii) of the ISDA Master Agreement.

Key Points

On October 4, 2011, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York ruled that a contractual right of a triangular (non-mutual) setoff was unenforceable in bankruptcy, even though the contract was safe harbored. In re Lehman Brothers, Inc., No. 08-01420 (JMP), 2011 WL 4553015 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 4, 2011).

In two recent decisions, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York has interpreted narrowly certain of the Bankruptcy Code’s safe harbor provisions.  

On September 21, 2010, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted BNY Corporate Trustee Services Limited leave to appeal a decision of the Bankruptcy Court in the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy case.1 The Bankruptcy Court held that a key provision of certain transaction documents constituted an unenforceable ipso facto clause. The District Court granted leave to appeal the Bankruptcy Court decision even though it was interlocutory.

The United States District Court for the District of Delaware recently affirmed a Bankruptcy Court decision that invalidated the use by creditors of so-called “triangular”, or non-mutual, setoffs in which obligations are offset among not only the parties to a bilateral contract but also their affiliates. In re SemCrude, L.P., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42477 (D. Del.

On May 5, 2009, Judge James Peck, the Bankruptcy Judge in the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy cases, held that the safe harbor provisions of the Bankruptcy Code do not override the mutuality requirements for setoff under section 553(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. As a consequence, the Bankruptcy Court prohibited Swedbank, a non-debtor counter party to a swap agreement, from setting off pre-petition claims against Lehman against funds collected for Lehman’s account postpetition. See In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., Bankr. Case No. 08-13555 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.

On January 25, 2010, Judge James M. Peck of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York ruled that provisions in a CDO indenture subordinating payments due to Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc., as swap provider, constituted unenforceable ipso facto clauses under the facts and circumstances of this case. The Court also held that, because the payment priority provisions were not contained in the four corners of a swap agreement, the Bankruptcy Code’s safe harbor protections, which generally permit the operation of ipso facto clauses, did not apply.

In a recent ruling from the bench, Judge James M. Peck of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York held that Metavante Corporation’s suspension of payments under an outstanding swap agreement with Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc.

Introduction

The High Court1 in England has confirmed the validity under English law of contractual provisions common in structured finance transactions which subordinate payments to a swap counterparty in circumstances where the swap counterparty has defaulted on its obligations under the terms of the relevant swap agreement.

The Judgment

Parties