On May 1, 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear Merit Management Group v. FTI Consulting, No. 16-784, on appeal from the U.S. Court of Appeals from the Seventh Circuit. See FTI Consulting, Inc. v. Merit Management Group, LP, 830 F.3d 690 (7th Cir. 2016) (a discussion of the Seventh Circuit's ruling is available here).

Last December, we updated you that the Supreme Court was considering whether to grant review of In re The Village at Lakeridge, LLC, 814 F.3d 993 (9th Cir. 2016). Our original post is here. On March 27, 2017, the Supreme Court granted review of Village at Lakeridge, but only as to one question presented, the most boring one in our view.

When the real estate market and financial markets tumbled during 2007-2008, the fallout was felt by financial institutions from large multi-billion dollar banks to small Community Banks. As these banks struggled to stay alive, a trend emerged for bank holding companies to market and sell a distressed bank through Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code. This alternative was utilized in many instances as opposed to a traditional “reorganization plan” or takeover by the FDIC.

In 2015, Distressing Matters reported on the Third Circuit’s decision in In re Jevic Holding Corp., wherein that panel ruled that, in rare circumstances, bankruptcy courts may approve the distribution of settlement proceeds in a manner that violates the Bankruptcy Code’s statutory priority scheme.

The decision by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in a 2-1 ruling,1 to vacate the rulings by the District Court of the Southern District of New York in the Marblegate dispute, reopens the traditional flexibility that companies have had for consent solicitations as part of liability management transactions, although some uncertainty may continue to persist.

Background

In a highly anticipated decision, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on March 22, 2017, in Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., No. 15-649, 2017 BL 89680 (U.S. Mar. 22, 2017), that, without the consent of affected creditors, bankruptcy courts may not approve "structured dismissals" providing for distributions which "deviate from the basic priority rules that apply under the primary mechanisms the [Bankruptcy] Code establishes for final distributions of estate value in business bankruptcies."

In Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding, 580 U.S. __(2017), decided on March 22, the U.S. Supreme Court held that, without the consent of impaired creditors, a bankruptcy court cannot approve a "structured dismissal" that provides for distributions deviating from the ordinary priority scheme of the Bankruptcy Code. The ruling reverses the decisions of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware, and the U.S.

HIGHLIGHTS:

Can a bankruptcy court order the “structured dismissal” of a Chapter 11 case if such dismissal would alter the ordinary priority rules for creditor distributions under the Bankruptcy Code? In Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 580 U.S. (March 22, 2017) (Jevic), the Supreme Court recently determined that such an order cannot issue without consent from all affected creditors even in “rare cases in which courts could find sufficient reasons to disregard priority.”

The United States Supreme Court (the “Court”) recently issued a long-awaited decision in Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp. (“Jevic”), which limits the use of “structured dismissals” in Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases, requiring structured dismissals pursuant to which final distributions are made to comply with the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme, or the consent of all affected parties to be obtained.1

What is a Structured Dismissal?