The Circuit Courts of Appeal have split on whether a prepetition transfer made by a debtor is avoidable if the transfer was made through a financial intermediary that was a mere conduit. Today, the Supreme Court unanimously resolved the split by deciding that transfers through “mere conduits” are not protected. This is a major (and adverse) decision for lenders, bondholders and noteholders who receive payments through an intermediary such as a disbursing agent.
Bankruptcy Code—Section 546(e) Safe Harbor
Merit Management Group, LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc., No. 16-784
Merit Management Group, LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc., No. 16-784 (2018)
The United States Supreme Court adopted revisions to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (“Bankruptcy Rules”), which went into effect on December 1, 2017. The revised Rules apply to all bankruptcy cases commenced on or after December 1, 2017, and may apply to cases commenced prior to such date if application is determined by the bankruptcy court to be “just and practicable.”
In bankruptcy, one of the “powers” granted to a trustee is the ability to undo previously completed transactions in order to facilitate payments to creditors. However, the Bankruptcy Code prevents a trustee from unwinding certain types of transactions. The safe harbor provision of 11 U.S.C. § 546(e) protects financial institutions performing securities transactions from having to disgorge payments initially made by a now bankrupt company.
The Bankruptcy Protector
Back in September, the Bankruptcy Protector announced that was introducing a new periodic series: theJevic Files. As promised, we have published intermittent updates identifying cases where Jevic priority skipping issues are raised and adjudicated.
In this post, we attempt to provide a succinct summary of all cases decided post-Jevic.
How Courts Are Applying Jevic
(B.A.P. 6th Cir. Nov. 28, 2017)
The Sixth Circuit B.A.P. affirms the bankruptcy court’s dismissal of the Chapter 12 bankruptcy case. The court finds that the bankruptcy court failed to give the debtor proper notice and opportunity to be heard prior to the dismissal. However, the violation of due process was harmless error. The delay in filing a confirmable plan and continuing loss to the estate warranted the dismissal. Opinion below.
Judge: Preston
Attorney for Appellant: Heather McKeever
In Clark’s Crystal Springs Ranch, LLC v. Gugino (In re Clark), 692 Fed. Appx. 946, 2017 BL 240043 (9th Cir. July 12, 2017), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that: (i) the remedy of "substantive consolidation" is governed by federal bankruptcy law, not state law; and (ii) because the Bankruptcy Code does not expressly forbid the substantive consolidation of debtors and nondebtors, the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Law v. Siegel, 134 S. Ct. 1188 (2014), does not bar bankruptcy courts from ordering the remedy.
In In re Millennium Lab Holdings II, LLC, 2017 BL 354864 (Bankr. D. Del. Oct. 3, 2017), the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware ruled that it had the constitutional authority to grant nonconsensual third-party releases in an order confirming the chapter 11 plan of laboratory testing company Millennium Lab Holdings II, LLC ("Millennium"). In so ruling, the court rejected an argument made by a group of creditors that a provision in Millennium’s plan releasing racketeering claims against the debtor’s former shareholders was prohibited by the U.S.
On November 9, responding to a request from the U.S. Supreme Court, the Solicitor General filed a brief at the Court recommending that the petition for writ of certiorari in Lamar, Archer & Cofrin, LLP v. Appling, No. 16-11911, be granted. The petition, seeking review of a unanimous panel decision of the Eleventh Circuit, presents the question of “whether (and, if so, when) a statement concerning a specific asset can be a ‘statement respecting the debtor's . . .