The Stern v. Marshall Decision. In its 2011 decision in Stern v. Marshall, decided by a 5-4 vote, the U.S. Supreme Court held that even though Congress designated certain state law counterclaims as “core” proceedings, Article III of the U.S. Constitution prohibits bankruptcy courts from finally adjudicating those claims. Stern v.

On June 9, 2014, the United States Supreme Court addressed an issue left open in Stern v. Marshall.¹ Instead of bringing clarity to procedural confusion created by Stern, the Court’s opinion in Executive Benefits Insurance Agency v.

On Monday, the Supreme Court confirmed¹ that bankruptcy courts may hear “Stern-type” matters (such as tortious interference counterclaims) that relate to bankruptcy proceedings, so long as a district court reviews the bankruptcy court’s proposed findings and renders the final decision. Other questions left in the wake of Stern v. Marshall,² however, remain unanswered and will continue to occupy the attention of parties to bankruptcy matters and courts alike.

BACKGROUND: IN THE WAKE OF STERN V. MARSHALL

In Executive Benefits Insurance Agency, petitioner vs.  Peter H. Arkison, Chapter 7 Trustee, Case No. 12-1200, 573 U.S. __(2014) the United States Supreme Court  ( Court) delivered its opinion as a follow up to its landmark decision in Stern v. Marshall.  In Stern v.

On June 9, 2014, the United States Supreme Court issued a unanimous opinion in Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Arkison (In re Bellingham Ins. Agency, Inc.), 573 U.S. ___ (2014), affirming the Ninth Circuit and holding that, while the Constitution does not permit a bankruptcy court to issue a final ruling in certain circumstances, it is permitted to issue proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to be reviewed de novo by the district court.

In 2011, the US Supreme Court issued its landmark decision in Stern v. Marshall. Turning decades of bankruptcy practice on its head, the Supreme Court held that, even though bankruptcy courts are statutorily authorized to enter final judgments in “core” matters, Article III of the Constitution prohibits them from finally adjudicating certain core matters, such as a debtor’s state law counterclaim against a creditor (so-called “Stern claims”).

On June 9, 2014, the Supreme Court issued a decision in Executive Benefits Insurance Agency v. Arkison, a case that tested the extent of the jurisdiction of bankruptcy court judges to decide fraudulent transfer and certain other claims against non-debtors. Ropes & Gray LLP represented the petitioner in obtaining certiorari and in the Supreme Court proceedings.

On June 9, 2014, the US Supreme Court issued a unanimous decision in Executive Benefits Insurance Agency v. Arkison (“Executive Benefits”)¹ that resolved a fundamental bankruptcy procedural issue that had arisen in the wake of Stern v.

In 2012, the Fifth Circuit ruled in In re Chilton that inherited IRAs constituted retirement funds within the “plain meaning” of §522 of the Bankruptcy Code and were thus exempt from the bankruptcy estate, under § 522(d)(12) (the federal exemptions). See our prior discussion of this case here.

After Chilton, many thought the issue was settled.

The United States Supreme Court recently denied certiorari to an Eleventh Circuit appeal which would have addressed the issue of whether section 506(d) of the Bankruptcy Code permits a chapter 7 debt to “strip off”¹ a wholly unsecured junior lien in Bank of America, N.A. v. Sinkfield.² As a result, wholly unsecured junior creditors will continue to suffer the harsh consequence of having its junior lien completely “stripped off” in Eleventh Circuit bankruptcy cases, despite other Circuits around the country holding to the contrary.