The Supreme Court has ruled that Financial Support Directions issued by the Pensions Regulator against insolvent companies can be claimed as provable debts in the insolvency process. The previous decisions of the High Court and Court of Appeal that they were to be paid as insolvency expenses have been overruled.

The decision was handed down in the Court’s judgment on the latest appeal in the long-running Nortel and Lehman saga, which arose out of a grey area in the elaborate statutory system for the funding of defined benefit pension schemes.

The Supreme Court has boosted the rescue culture by ruling that Financial Support Directions (FSDs) issued by the UK Pensions Regulator after commencement of insolvency proceedings are not an expense of the administration and, instead, rank on a par with unsecured claims. This decision in the Nortel and Lehman administrations will be reassuring to creditors and insolvency and restructuring practitioners.

Key Points

Summary

The Supreme Court has today allowed an appeal against the decision of the Court of Appeal (14 October 2011) which, in certain circumstances in an insolvency situation, would have accorded “super priority” to a financial support direction made by the Pensions Regulator.

The Supreme Court yesterday issued its decision in the long-running case concerning financial support directions (“FSDs”) issued by the UK Pensions Regulator to various companies in the Nortel and Lehman groups. The case considered where a company's obligations under an FSD should rank in relation to its other debts if the company was insolvent when the FSD was issued.

Snapshot

The Supreme Court handed down its long-awaited judgment today in the Nortel/Lehman case on where a contribution notice (CN) or financial support direction (FSD) issued by the Pensions Regulator (TPR) on a company that is already in insolvency proceedings (eg administration) ranks in the order of priority of payment.

The Supreme Court handed down its decision yesterday on the combined appeals of Nortel GmbH (In Administration) ("Nortel") and Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (In Administration) ("Lehman Brothers") (together, the "Appellants") against the Pensions Regulator ("tPR").

Almost five years after the enactment of the Bankruptcy Abuse and Consumer Protection Act, the Supreme Court recently ruled in Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A., et al v. United States that attorneys are “debt relief agencies” who are limited in their ability to provide pre-bankruptcy planning advice to consumers and obligating them to provide additional disclosures in their advertisements.

Attorneys Are Debt Relief Agencies Under BAPCPA

Many bankruptcy practitioners are familiar with the general tenet that an obligation secured only by a mortgage on the Debtor’s principal residence is immune from modification or avoidance by the Debtor. Sections 1123(b)(5) and 1322(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code protect residential mortgages from being “stripped-down” to the value of the subject real estate or subjecting the terms of the underlying obligation to modification.

On May 18th, the Second Circuit, applying the Supreme Court's holding in Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. U.S., 130 S.Ct. 1324 (2010), reversed a trial court order finding that provisions of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act that prohibit debt relief agencies from advising clients to incur more debt were overbroad and unconstitutional when applied to attorneys.

On June 2, 2010, the Third Circuit overruled longstanding precedent interpreting the definition of a “claim” under the Bankruptcy Code. In JELD-WEN, Inc. v. Van Brunt (In re Grossman’s Inc.), No. 09-1563, slip op., (3d Cir. June 2, 2010) an en banc panel rejected the state law accrual theory of claims recognition established in Avellino & Bienes v. M. Frenville Co. (Matter of M. Frenville Co.), 744 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1984), in favor of the more widely followed conduct test theory.