In connection with recognition, PT Bakrie’s foreign representative sought an order from the Bankruptcy Court enforcing its Indonesian PKPU Plan. The foreign representative argued that the plan provided a discharge of the debtor, and all other parties, from any liability in respect of the intercompany loans at issue. By seeking enforcement of the PKPU Plan, the foreign representative effectively sought a release of non-debtor third parties from liability to the Objecting Noteholders and others, including in respect of the approximate $161 million stipulated judgment.
On April 19, 2021, the United States Supreme Court denied a petition for certiorari from the Second Circuit’s decision in In re Tribune Company Fraudulent Conveyance Litigation (“Tribune II”),[1] leaving intact the Second Circuit’s decision upholding the safe harbor defense to avoidance actions und
On March 31, 2021, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Nevada awarded attorney’s fees to a debtor under a Nevada fee-shifting statute for objecting to a time-barred proof of claim.1 The opinion serves as a warning that filing a proof of claim for time-barred debt may carry consequences other than claim disallowance despite the Supreme Court’s recent holding in Midland Fu
The question whether the institution or continuation of a proceeding under Section 138/141 of the Negotiable Instruments (NI) Act can be said to be covered by the moratorium provision, namely, Section 14 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC) has been a crucial issue in the legal domain. Various High courts have had dissenting opinion in relation to this concerning matter. However the Apex court has now put an end to all doubts and confusions.
In March, we reported on a brief filed by the Solicitor General recommending denial of a petition for certiorari filed by Tribune creditors seeking Supreme Court review of the Second Circuit ruling dismissing their state-law fraudulent transfer claims.
The Supreme Court in the case of Laxmi Pat Surana vs Union Bank of India & Anr. [Civil Appeal No. 2734 of 2020] (“Laxmi Pat”) has settled the issue of the applicability of Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (“LimitationAct”) to applications for initiation of insolvency proceedings under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (“IBC”).
The debtors' legal malpractice claim was "not property of their bankruptcy estate," held a split Ninth Circuit on June 30, 2020. In re Glaser, 816 Fed. Appx. 103, 104 (9th Cir. June 30, 2020) (2-1). But the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota one week later affirmed a bankruptcy court judgment that "the [debtor's] estate was the proper owner" of such a claim. In re Bruess, 2020 WL3642324, 1 (D. Minn. July 6, 2020).
A secured lender's "mere retention of property [after a pre-bankruptcy repossession] does not violate" the automatic stay provision [362(a) (3)] of the Bankruptcy Code, held a unanimous U.S. Supreme Court on Jan. 14, 2021. City of Chicago v. Fulton, 2021 WL 125106, 4 ( Jan. 14, 2021). Reversing the Seventh Circuit's affirmance of a bankruptcy court judgment holding a secured lender in contempt for violating the automatic stay, the Court resolved "a split" in the Circuits. Id. at 2. The Second, Eighth and Ninth Circuits had agreed with the Seventh Circuit.
On January 14, 2021, the U.S. Supreme Court held in City of Chicago v. Fulton, 592 U.S. __ (2021), that a creditor in possession of a debtor's property does not violate the automatic stay, specifically section 362(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code, by retaining the property after the filing of a bankruptcy petition. The Court's decision provides important guidance to bankruptcy courts, practitioners, and parties on the scope of the automatic stay's requirements.
In In re Nuverra Environmental Solutions, Inc., 834 Fed. App'x 729 (3d Cir. 2021), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit handed down a long-awaited ruling that could have addressed, but ultimately did not address, the validity of "gifting" chapter 11 plans under which a senior creditor class gives a portion of its statutorily entitled recovery to one or more junior classes as a means of achieving consensual confirmation.