Imagine this: a U.S. District Court enters judgment in a case that’s “related to” a bankruptcy, and we want to file a motion for new trial or to amend the judgment.
So, which deadline applies to the motion:
This is how Tribune ends: not with a bang, but a whimper. The 12-year litigation saga, rooted in the spectacular failure of the media and sports conglomerate’s 2007 leveraged buyout, reached an end in late February with a curt “cert. denied” from the US Supreme Court.
Morgan Lewis was one of the firms that captained the defense for Tribune’s former shareholders. This post notes some lessons that we learned—and relearned.
Lesson One: Section 546(e)’s ‘New’ Safe Harbor
Supreme Court to Resolve Circuit Split on Constitutionality of U.S. Trustee Fee Hike
When existing interest holders attempt to retain ownership of a chapter 11 debtor after confirmation of a nonconsensual plan of reorganization, the Bankruptcy Code's plan confirmation requirements, including well-established rules regarding the classification and treatment of creditor claims and equity interests, can create formidable impediments to their reorganization strategy. In In re Platinum Corral, LLC, 2022 WL 127431 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Jan. 13, 2022), the U.S.
After more than a decade, litigation resulting from the failed leveraged buyout (LBO) of media giant Tribune Company has finally drawn to a close. On Feb. 22, 2022, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to review the latest decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in In re Tribune Co. Fraudulent Conveyance Litig., 10 F.4th 147 (2d Cir.
The US Supreme Court tends to hear a couple of bankruptcy cases per term. Most of these cases deal with interpreting provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. However, every few years or so, the Supreme Court decides a constitutional issue in bankruptcy. Some are agita-inducing (Northern Pipeline, Stern), some less so (Katz). The upcoming case is a little more nuanced, but could have major consequences.
The opinion is Wells Fargo Bank, Indenture Trustee v. The Hertz Corp. (In re The Hertz Corp)
The question is whether (and at what rate) post-petition interest can be recovered on pre-petition unsecured claims, when debtor is solvent, under the “solvent debtor exception.” The answers pit equitable arguments against statutory provisions and even looks back to caselaw under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals recently issued an opinion that potentially broadens the proximate cause element of claims brought under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). RICO’s proximate cause element requires a plaintiff to allege facts plausibly establishing that there is a “direct relationship” between the claimed injury and the defendant’s conduct in violation of RICO.
The Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP) recently held that merely freezing a debtor’s bank account holding funds that had been garnished by a judgment creditor did not violate the automatic stay. This decision was based on the United States Supreme Court’s ruling last year in City of Chicago v. Fulton, holding that retention of repossessed vehicles that were possessed before a bankruptcy was filed did not violate the automatic stay.
In the First, Sixth (in some districts within the circuit), Eighth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits an appeal from a bankruptcy court order may go either to the district court, as elsewhere in the country, or, uniquely to those five circuits, to a Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP). The BAP is a three-judge panel selected from bankruptcy judges in the circuit but not the same district. Under the statute, presumptively the appeal goes to the BAP but the appellant may elect to go to the district court.