Here’s a due process question that’s percolating before the U.S. Supreme Court and a related mediation issue:

This is the fourth in a series of four articles on why Fed.R.Bankr.P. 9031, titled “Masters Not Authorized,” needs to be amended to authorize the utilization of special masters in complex bankruptcy cases.

The focus of this fourth article is on how federal courts have inherent authority to appoint special masters—and why that inherent authority should not be denied in bankruptcy cases.[Fn. 1]

Inherent Authority of Courts of Equity

This is the third in a series of four articles on why Fed.R.Bankr.P. 9031, titled “Masters Not Authorized,” needs to be amended to authorize the utilization of special masters in complex bankruptcy cases.

The focus of this third article is on how the evolution of the old bankruptcy referees into today’s bankruptcy courts shows why special masters are needed in complex bankruptcy cases—and should not have been prohibited.[Fn. 1]

The Evolution of Bankruptcy

When leveraged buyouts (“LBOs”) fail, the selling shareholders are litigation targets. A common suit is a claim by a bankruptcy trustee asserting constructive fraudulent transfer claims seeking to claw-back payments to the selling shareholders from the loan proceeds that financed the LBO.

In a 2021 ruling, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit revived nearly 100 lawsuits seeking to recover fraudulent transfers made as part of the Madoff Ponzi scheme. In one of the latest chapters in that resurrected litigation, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York held in Picard v. ABN AMRO Bank NV (In re Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC), 654 B.R. 224 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.

One year ago, we wrote that 2022 would be remembered in the corporate bankruptcy world for the "crypto winter" that descended in November 2022 with the spectacular collapse of FTX Trading Ltd., Alameda Research, and approximately 130 other affiliated companies that ignited the meltdown of many other platforms, exchanges, lenders, and mining operations because they did business with FTX.

Because bankruptcy courts were created by Congress rather than under Article III of the U.S. Constitution, there is a disagreement over whether bankruptcy courts, like other federal courts, have "inherent authority" to impose sanctions for civil contempt on parties that refuse to comply with their orders. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit revisited this debate in In re Markus, 78 F.4th 554 (2nd Cir. 2023).

The scope of the Bankruptcy Code's "safe harbor" shielding certain securities, commodity, or forward-contract payments from avoidance as fraudulent transfers has long been a magnet for controversy, particularly after the U.S. Supreme Court suggested (but did not hold) in Merit Mgmt. Grp., LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc., 138 S. Ct.

You can’t make this stuff up. The legal issues are pedestrian. But the facts behind those issues are incredible!

Litigation History

Here’s the boring stuff first.

On January 8, 2024, the U.S. Supreme Court denies certiorari in Mann v. LSQ Funding Group, L.C. (Case No. 23-425). Here’s the procedural background:

Oral arguments happened on January 9, 2024, at the U.S. Supreme Court in U.S.Trustee v. Hammons.Here is a link to the transcript of those arguments.

The Hammons question is this: