Section 363(m) of the Bankruptcy Code is one of the most important and well-known statutes to bankruptcy practitioners. This section of the Bankruptcy Code protects a good faith asset purchaser who purchases assets from a debtor’s bankruptcy estate from having the sale unwound when the sale (or an aspect of the sale) is challenged by an appeal.

Every secured lender hates to hear it: Yet another statutory scheme could potentially cause the lender to lose its first priority security interest in certain collateral. While the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act (PACA) has been around since 1930, it is often forgotten or overlooked by many lenders. However, to the extent that a lender's collateral includes perishable agricultural commodities, such as when the borrower is a restaurant or grocery store, PACA can present significant risks for a lender.

PACA Basics

Dismissal of a bankruptcy—for bad faith filing—is a rarity.

So, how a bankruptcy court grapples with the bad faith issue . . . and ends up dismissing the bankruptcy . . . can provide a lesson for us all.

What follows is a summary of how a Chapter 11 bankruptcy is dismissed when the Court is convinced that the bankruptcy is intended for the benefit of a non-debtor . . . and not for the benefit of the debtor or its creditors.

Highlights

The Supreme Court held Section 363(m) is only a “statutory limitation” to accessing appellate relief in disputed bankruptcy sales that requires parties to take certain procedural steps to be effective

The Supreme Court also addressed mootness arguments and held that as long as parties have a concrete interest, however small, in the outcome of an appeal, the appeal should remain alive

The ruling provides insight as to how the Supreme Court may tackle the controversial doctrine of “equitable mootness”

It’s a defense v. offense distinction:

• Defense—An objection and counterclaim designed to diminish or zero-out a proof of claim in bankruptcy is not subject to arbitration; but
• Offense—An objection or counterclaim designed to do anything more . . . can be compelled to arbitrate.

That’s the essence of a recent opinion in Johnson v. S.A.I.L. LLC (In re Johnson), Adv. No. 22 -172, Northern Illinois Bankruptcy Court (issued March 28, 2023; Doc. 18). What follows is a summary of that opinion.

Facts

On April 19, 2023, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in MOAC Mall Holdings LLC v. Transform Holdco LLC, in which the Court considered whether 11 U.S.C. § 363(m) is jurisdictional. A unanimous Court held that § 363(m) is not jurisdictional, determining that the language of the statute “takes as a given the exercise of judicial power over any authorization under § 363(b) or § 363(c).” This determination is based upon the requirement that for a statutory precondition to be jurisdictional, Congress must clearly state the intent.

Purchasers often relish the prospect of buying distressed assets in a bankruptcy proceeding. Under section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code, a buyer may obtain ownership of bankruptcy estate assets “free and clear of any interest” (assuming certain conditions are met), and also be reasonably confident that the sale will not be reversed on appeal. But the U.S. Supreme Court may have now tempered that confidence. In its recent, unanimous opinion, MOAC Mall Holdings LLC v. Transform Holdco LLC, No. 21-1270 (Apr.

The U.S. Supreme Court recently issued its latest bankruptcy opinion in MOAC Mall Holdings LLC v. Transform Holdco LLC, holding that the Bankruptcy Code’s rule against invalidating 363 sales after appeal is not an iron-clad jurisdictional bar, but rather a mere statutory limitation.[1]

In Short

The Situation: The U.S. Supreme Court considered whether § 363(m) of the Bankruptcy Code, which limits a party's ability to undo an asset transfer made to a good-faith purchaser in a bankruptcy case, is jurisdictional.

On April 24, 2023, the First Circuit’s opinion in Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Coughlin came up for oral argument before the Supreme Court. At issue in this appeal is whether this provision’s “abrogat[ion]” of sovereign immunity “as to a governmental unit,” defined to include any “other … domestic government” in section 101(27), embodies a congressional intention to revoke the sovereign immunity of a Native American tribe with sufficient and obvious clarity to be construed as such a revocation.