Federal law assigns to U.S. district courts original jurisdiction over all cases under Title 11 (the Bankruptcy Code) and all civil proceedings arising under Title 11 or arising in or relating to Title 11. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a), (b). Federal law permits each U.S. district court to refer such cases and civil proceedings to bankruptcy courts, and district courts generally do so. But bankruptcy courts, unlike district courts, are not courts under Article III of the Constitution, and are therefore constrained in what powers they may constitutionally exercise.
This isn’t going to end well.
Looks like our bankruptcy system in these United States is about to take a big hit—to the tune of hundreds of millions of dollars (projected to be around $350 million). And those responsible for creating the debacle are going to skate.
Here’s how.
U.S. Trustee v. John Q. Hammons
Section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code's "safe harbor" preventing avoidance in bankruptcy of certain securities, commodity, or forward-contract payments has long been a magnet for controversy. Several noteworthy court rulings have been issued in bankruptcy cases addressing the application of the provision, including application to financial institutions, its preemptive scope, and its application to non-publicly traded securities.
Bankruptcy trustees and chapter 11 debtors-in-possession ("DIPs") frequently seek to avoid fraudulent transfers and obligations under section 544(b) of the Bankruptcy Code and state fraudulent transfer or other applicable nonbankruptcy laws because the statutory "look-back" period for avoidance under many nonbankruptcy laws exceeds the two-year period governing avoidance actions under section 548.
Section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code's "safe harbor" preventing avoidance in bankruptcy of certain securities, commodity, or forward-contract payments has long been a magnet for controversy. Several noteworthy court rulings have been issued in bankruptcy cases addressing the application of the provision, including application to financial institutions, its preemptive scope, and its application to non-publicly traded securities.
The court-fashioned doctrine of "equitable mootness" has frequently been applied to bar appeals of bankruptcy court orders under circumstances where reversal or modification of an order could jeopardize, for example, the implementation of a negotiated chapter 11 plan or related agreements and upset the expectations of third parties who have relied on the order.
Federal appellate courts have traditionally applied a "person aggrieved" standard to determine whether a party has standing to appeal a bankruptcy court order or judgment. However, this standard, which requires a direct, adverse, and financial impact on a potential appellant, is derived from a precursor to the Bankruptcy Code and does not appear in the existing statute.
In Mann v. LSQ Funding Group, L.C., 71 F.4th 640 (7th Cir. 2023), reh'g denied, 2023 WL 4684702 (7th Cir. July 21, 2023), the U.S.
The United States Trustee Program is responsible for the efficient administration of bankruptcy cases throughout most of the country. Since 1986, the Trustee Program has covered all states except North Carolina and Alabama, where an Administrator Program oversees bankruptcy filings instead. Although there are many similarities between the two programs, there is a significant difference in the funding structure. The Trustee Program is entirely self-funded through quarterly fees paid by debtors that file in the Trustee Program districts.
The equitable mootness doctrine is before the U.S. Supreme Court on a Petition for writ of certiorari. The case is U.S. Bank National Association v. Windstream Holdings, Inc.[Fn. 1]
All who’ve seen an effort to abuse equitable mootness, from a creditor’s view, will appreciate the following information from U.S. Bank’s Petition and from a supporting Amicus Brief of law professors in U.S. Bank v. Windstream.