The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held, in a split decision, on March 22, 2010, that secured creditors do not have a statutory right to credit bid1 their debt at an asset sale conducted under a “cramdown” reorganization plan. In re Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC, et al., --- F.3d ----, 2010 WL 1006647 (3d Cir. March 22, 2010) (2-1).

The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit recently held that an oversecured lender holds at least an unsecured claim for contractual prepayment penalties against a solvent debtor. UPS Capital Business Credit v. Gencarelli (In re Gencarelli), 2007 BL 91656 (1st Cir., Aug. 30, 2007). As the court explained, "[t]his is a difficult question that has significant ramifications for the commercial lending industry." Id. at 16.

On May 29, 2012, the United States Supreme Court issued an opinion in the Radlax Gateway Hotel bankruptcy proceeding regarding the viability of a plan of reorganization that prohibited a bank from credit-bidding on the debtors’ assets.  See Radlax Gateway Hotel, LLC, et al., v. Amalgamated Bank, __S.Ct.__ No. 11-166, 2012 WL 1912197 (U.S. May 29, 2012)(hereinafter “Opinion at * ___”).  The debtors in Radlax (“Debtors”) purchased a hotel at the Los Angeles International Airport, along with an adjacent property.

The two most recent decisions of the Supreme Court involving federal taxes illustrate how a conservative approach to statutory interpretation tends to prevail, but only with great effort, and changing constituencies.

Hall v. United States

In Lehman Brothers Special Financing, Inc. v. Ballyrock ABS CDO 2007-1 Limited (In re Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc.), Adv. P. No. 09-01032 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 12, 2011) [hereinafter “Ballyrock”], the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York held that a contractual provision that subordinates the priority of a termination payment owing under a credit default swap (CDS) to a debtor in bankruptcy, and which caps the amount of the termination payment, may be an unenforceable ipso facto clause under section 541(c)(1)(B).

Section 153 (1)(b)(ii) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (the Act) is intended to afford a remedy to affected persons who support a business rescue plan that has been 

The section can be broken down into five key elements:

The United States Third Circuit Court of Appeals (the "Third Circuit") issued an opinion on February 16, 2011 in the American Home Mortgage chapter 11 proceeding that upheld a determination by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (the "Bankruptcy Court") on the valuation of a creditor’s claim that in connection with the termination and acceleration of a mortgage loan repurchase agreement.1 The decision is significant because the Third Circuit affirmed the Bankruptcy Court’s decision that the post-acceleration market value of the mortgage loans was not a relevant m

Introduction

The decision of the Supreme Court of Canada last month in Century Services Inc. v. Canada1 is of striking interest to the tax and insolvency bars. The Court considered Crown priorities, in particular, the various “deemed trust” provisions found in section 227 of the Income Tax Act (Canada),2 section 86 of the Employment Insurance Act,3 section 23 of the Canada Pension Plan (the “CPP”)4 and in particular section 222 of the Excise Tax Act (GST Portions).5

On March 22, 2010, in a 2-1 decision, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that a debtor may proceed with an auction sale under a Chapter 11 plan without providing a secured lender the right to credit bid for its collateral.

In our October 2010 insolvency legal update, we reviewed the case of South Canterbury Finance Ltd v Nielsen, where the Court found in favour of second mortgagee, SCF, on the interpretation of a deed of priority.  That case was appealed successfully to the Court of Appeal by the first mortgagee, ASB.  This update provides a brief review of the Court of Appeal's reasoning.