What can a lender do about successive bankruptcy filings by a borrower? What can lessors do when their tenants file successive bankruptcy petitions? A recent decision by a bankruptcy court in the Eastern District of New York gives guidance on these questions.
Judge Carey in the District of Delaware recently ruled on an intriguing question—can a defendant in a preference action reduce the amount of a recoverable preference by setting off the value of an allowed administrative expense claim?. Though not late-breaking news, this case provides a thorough examination of the essential character of administrative expense claims.
The concept of “equitable mootness” is a doctrine of relatively long-standing in bankruptcy jurisprudence. It has been used by courts to avoid determination of issues raised on appeal that would require the unscrambling of a plan previously confirmed and implemented. However, that doctrine has recently been questioned in a variety of decisions. It appears that the scope of equitable mootness is clearly ebbing. In that context, a recent decision by this Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals provides an opportunity to further examine the doctrine.
In a prior post, we discussed the Third Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in Jevic Holding Corp., where the court upheld the use of so-called “structured dismissals” in bankruptcy cases, and the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari. Yesterday, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Jevic. The Court’s ultimate ruling will likely have a significant impact upon bankruptcy practice.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals, in an opinion authored by Judge Thomas Ambro, has reversed two district court opinions and refused to allow a company to use a Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing as a means to reduce interest on its debt obligations. Specifically, the court held that filing for bankruptcy would not excuse a debtor from its obligation for a “make-whole” payment otherwise due to its lenders.
Recently, in Caesars Entertainment Operating Co. (“Caesars”), U.S. Bankruptcy Judge A. Benjamin Goldgar denied payment of indenture trustee Wilmington Trust’s attorneys’ fees and costs in connection with the Debtors’ motion to approve a settlement. The U.S. Trustee objected to payment arguing that the Debtor could not rely on 11 U.S.C. § 363 (seeking settlement approval) as authority to pay Wilmington Trust’s fees and costs. Sustaining the U.S.
What does it mean to “cure” a default in the context of a plan of reorganization? This question arises by virtue of section 1123(a)(5)(G) of the Bankruptcy Code, which requires that a plan provide adequate means for the plan’s implementation, including the “curing or waiving of any default.” On November 4, 2016, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals defined what it means to “cure” by holding that a debtor can only cure a contractual default under a plan of reorganization by complying with contractual post-default interest rate provisions.
Among other strategic considerations a financially troubled company must grapple with as it prepares for a potential bankruptcy filing is how best to effectively implement necessary workforce reductions as part of its overall reorganization efforts. A workforce reduction could potentially give rise to severance and other employee obligations, and, under certain circumstances, could also give rise to significant WARN Act claims.
In a recent memorandum decision, Judge Robert S. Bardwil of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of California sanctioned a Sacramento attorney and ordered him to complete a local e-filing course because he did not maintain copies of filed documents that included the original “wet” signature.
In a recent decision in In re Packaging Systems, LLC, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey ruled that a lender that held a “super-priority” administrative expense claim under section 364(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code was still entitled to its super-priority status even after the debtor’s case converted to chapter 7.