“Bad news comes in threes.” “Third time’s the charm.” “Three strikes and you’re out.”

One of these three adages may come to characterize the outcome of a case of significant import argued before the US Supreme Court this week. The Supreme Court heard arguments on Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif. The case is the third in a trilogy including Stern v. Marshall and Executive Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, which examine the scope of the constitutional exercise of judicial power by bankruptcy courts.

Under section 365(f)(1), a debtor is permitted to assume and assign leases and executory contracts notwithstanding contractual limitations or “applicable law” that restricts such assignment. However, that broad general authorization begins with the limiting language, “except as provided in subsection (b) and (c) of this section….”

Put your lender’s hat on. Wouldn’t it be great if you could prevent your borrower from filing bankruptcy in the first place? Unfortunately for lenders, a recent decision demonstrates how hard it is to prevent bankruptcy filings.

In ordinary civil litigation, appellate review is generally limited to “final judgments,” in order to prevent the wastefulness of appeals on rulings that are not truly dispositive of the case. That notion becomes somewhat more difficult in a bankruptcy, where there are often multiple litigations within the umbrella bankruptcy case. But does that mean that notions of finality should be different in the bankruptcy context? Not so, at least according to the Sixth Circuit.

The Supreme Court granted cert last Friday in the case of Bullard v.

Imagine: you are a lender that has loaned substantial sums of money to an individual, secured by real property owned by the borrower. After the borrower defaults and negotiations fail, you seek and obtain the appointment of a receiver. But now litigation ensues—about the loan documents, about contract defaults, about interest rates, about foreign law. After a substantial investment of time and money, your trial date draws closer. At some point during this odyssey, your borrower secretly transfers the real property collateral to a newly-created, single-member LLC.

In In re Eifler, issued yesterday, the Sixth Circuit passed up an opportunity to join the First and Fifth Circuits in adopting a “transparently plain” exception to the reliance-on-counsel defense by which a bankrupt debtor can demonstrate a lack of fraudulent intent.

On December 1, 2014, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the Financial Institution Bankruptcy Act of 2014(FIBA).  The legislation passed on a voice vote and is supported by the major Wall Street banks.

All bankruptcy practitioners know that a debtor may choose which contracts to assume and which contracts to reject.  But may a debtor reject contracts that are part of an overall, integrated transaction?  In a recent bankruptcy decision, the court found the answer to be no, at least if the parties are careful in drafting their contracts.

According to a recent decision from the Delaware Supreme Court, a secured party bears the burden of any mistakes in its security documents.  Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Motors Liquidation Co. v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 325, 2014 Del. LEXIS 491 (Del. Oct. 17, 2014) (“Del.