What are the limits of a bankruptcy court’s authority to issue final orders and judgments? Does a bankruptcy court have authority under Article III of the U.S. Constitution to enter final orders in quintessential bankruptcy matters such as fraudulent transfer claims, or are the court’s powers more constrained? While the Supreme Court’s rulings in Stern v. Marshall, 546 U.S. 462 (2011), Executive Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, 573 U.S. 25 (2014) and Wellness International Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct.

The recent decision by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in In re Provider Meds, L.L.C. is a stark reminder to chapter 7 trustees that they have an affirmative obligation to examine a debtor’s assets. A trustee’s failure to conduct a sufficient and timely examination may deprive the estate of significant value.

Municipalities often drive economic development through subsidiaries and affiliated entities. When these “quasi-municipalities” become distressed, however, questions arise as to whether the potential debtor qualifies as a debtor under Chapter 11 or Chapter 9. This uncertainty can lead to litigation over whether the entity may proceed as a Chapter 11 debtor or is a governmental unit that must proceed through a Chapter 9 bankruptcy filing. In states where Chapter 9 is not authorized, Chapter 11 may be the only available option for a supervised restructuring.

HM Revenue & Customs (“HMRC”) has issued a consultation entitled “Tax Abuse and Insolvency: A Discussion Document” on how it proposes to confront those who misuse insolvency law as a means of avoiding or evading their tax liabilities.

Under German law, there are strict legal obligations for the managing directors of an insolvent company to file for insolvency. Failure to comply exposes a managing director to civil and criminal liability. It is therefore important for managing directors to know how to test whether their company is insolvent. One of the legal reasons for insolvency is illiquidity and the second senate of the German Federal Civil Court (“BGH”) has, in a decision dated 19 December 2017 (II ZR 88/16), clarified a question regarding the illiquidity test.

Much has already been written about the proposal for the “Second Chance” directive (“Proposal“) published in November 2016 which is still being debated by the EU bodies – and rightly so. Harmonisation of insolvency law across the EU is needed as one in four insolvency proceedings is a cross-border insolvency and creditors need to know what to expect in other EU countries and that the courts and practitioners cooperate in an efficient way.

On September 22, 2017, the First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court, and overruled its own prior guidance, to hold that a committee of unsecured creditors had the right to be heard in adversary proceedings related to the restructuring of Puerto Rico’s debt. The Court’s decision in Assured Guar. Corp. v. Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R. (In re Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd.

Regulation 2015/848 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015

With commercial activities increasingly having an impact across borders in the European market, it has become increasingly necessary to introduce supranational legislation to regulate those activities. In particular, there is a need to make cross-border insolvency proceedings convenient, consistent, effective and efficient across Europe.

As 26 June 2017 approaches – the date of entry into effect of the Recast EU Insolvency Regulation (2015/8484/EU) – we look in detail at the new provisions for co-ordinating the insolvency proceedings of members of a pan-European group of companies and consider whether the new proposals for co-operation will be compulsory, the practicalities of who will pay the co-ordinator’s fees and whether the creditors can have a say in the process.

BACKGROUND

We have written in the past about the doctrine of equitable mootness. A March 30, 2017 per curiam affirmance by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Beem v. Ferguson (In re Ferguson) explores the concept and limitations of equitable mootness and distinguishes it from the related doctrine of constitutional mootness.