The Sixth Circuit affirms the 2015 consent order specifying the manner in which certain provisions of the confirmed Chapter 11 plan would apply to a class of claim holders. The Korean Claimants objected, arguing that the district court lacked authority to enter the consent order and that the consent order was an impermissible modification of the distribution agreement. The court holds that the court had the requisite authority to enter the consent order and it merely clarified the distribution agreement rather than modified it. Opinion below.

Judge: Kethledge

(6th Cir. B.A.P. Mar. 3, 2016)

Ruling from the bench on April 4, Bankruptcy Judge Alan Koschik of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Ohio denied approval of a disclosure statement proposed by FirstEnergy Solutions Corp. because the plan it described was “patently unconfirmable.”[1]

It is a unique characteristic of debt restructuring under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code that a majority of a class of creditors can accept a modification of the terms of the debts owed to the class members, as provided in a plan of reorganization, and thereby bind non-accepting class members.[1] The ordinary route to confirming a Chapter 11 plan is to obtain its acceptance by a majority of every impaired class of creditors and equity hold

The Bottom Line

The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Merit Management Group L.P. v. FTI Consulting Inc. to resolve a circuit split over the interpretation of Section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, the “safe harbor” provision that shields specified types of payments “made by or to (or for the benefit of)” a financial institution from avoidance on fraudulent transfer grounds.

The Bottom Line:

In a case of first impression, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently held that antidiscrimination laws may be violated when a white employee is fired for having a black spouse. In Holcomb v. Iona College, 521 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2008), the Second Circuit vacated and remanded a federal district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Iona College (the “College”), finding that triable issues existed as to whether the College’s decision to terminate its employee, Craig Holcomb, was based at least in part upon a racially discriminatory motive.

In Giant Eagle, Inc. v. Phar-Mor, Inc.,1 the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that a lessor-claimant whose lease was rejected pursuant to section 365(a) of Title 11 of the Bankruptcy Code was entitled to a claim for future-rent damages against the debtor, even though the lessor had entered into a nearly identical substitute lease. The Court concluded that efforts to mitigate damages by the lessor would not be considered in reducing the actual damage claim when those efforts failed to reduce the actual harm suffered by the lessor.

The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Sixth Circuit (BAP) recently held that a mortgagee that held a collateral assignment of rents on property in which the debtor had no equity was not adequately protected by cash collateral orders entered by the bankruptcy court that granted the lender a "replacement lien" on post-petition rents.