It is often said that the acid test of a security interest or lien on property is the bankruptcy of the property owner. If that person or entity files a bankruptcy petition, the bankruptcy trustee has a number of options to challenge or even avoid certain liens. A lien that is not properly perfected is subject to attack by a trustee under both the “strong-arm clause” (Bankruptcy Code § 544) and the preference provisions (Bankruptcy Code § 547). If the lien is avoided, the property can then be sold and the proceeds distributed to the unsecured creditors.
Sometime this summer, the Supreme Court is expected to issue its ruling in U.S. v. Quality Stores. In this case, the Supreme Court reviewed the Sixth Circuit’s holding that supplemental unemployment compensation benefits (“SUB payments”) relating to severance payments are not subject to FICA taxes. U.S. v. Quality Stores, 693 F.3d 605 (6th Cir. 2012). The Sixth Circuit decision resurrects a long-disputed issue regarding the applicability of FICA to severance pay.
The Sixth Circuit in its recent opinion in Grant, Konvalinka & Harrison, P.C. v. Still (In re McKenzie), 737 F.3d 1034 (6th Cir.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that no exception exists to Tennessee’s general prohibition on direct actions against an insurer, even in cases where the insured has declared bankruptcy triggering an automatic stay before a judgment in the underlying action. Mauriello v. Great American E&S Insurance Co., 2014 WL 321921 (6th Cir. Jan. 30, 2014). In so holding, the Sixth Circuit reasoned that an adequate remedy remains notwithstanding the automatic stay for a claimant to obtain a judgment against a bankrupt insured.
In December, the Sixth Circuit, in Grant, Konvalinka & Harrison, P.C. v. Still (In re McKenzie), 737 F.3d 1034 (6th Cir. 2013), addressed two matters of first impression when it adopted the majority rules that (i) a creditor who seeks relief from the bankruptcy automatic stay has the burden to prove the validity of its perfected security interest in collateral; and (ii) the expiration of the two-year statute of limitations on bankruptcy avoidance actions does not prevent the trustee from asserting them defensively under section 502(d) of the Bankruptcy Code.
Nearly 30 years after enactment of the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 and establishment of the current bankruptcy court structure, courts are still struggling to understand the bounds of a bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction and power. Unfortunately for one recent appellant, a bankruptcy court’s power to enter punitive damages is not as great as it had hoped.
In recent years, bankruptcy courts have come closer to reaching a consensus regarding their ability to recharacterize debt into equity. Yet, beneath this consensus lies a deepening divide that lenders should be aware of. Recharacterization challenges “the assertion of a debt against the bankruptcy estate on the ground that the ‘loaned’ capital was actually an equity investment.” In re Insilco Techs., Inc., 480 F.3d 212, 217 (3d Cir. 2007) (internal citations omitted).
On December 5, 2013, Judge Steven Rhodes of the US Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Michigan held that the city of Detroit had satisfied the five expressly delineated eligibility requirements for filing under Chapter 9 of the US Bankruptcy Code1 and so could proceed with its bankruptcy case.
The Michigan judge overseeing Detroit’s historic bankruptcy case found today that parties seeking to appeal his order finding the city eligible for bankruptcy protection may proceed directly to the Sixth Circuit.
The US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has ruled that a lender’s security interest in accounts was not perfected because a reference to “proceeds” in the lender’s UCC financing statement did not expressly refer to “accounts.” The Sixth Circuit surprisingly interpreted the definition of “proceeds”1 in Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code to exclude “accounts”2 (despite and without reference to provisions of UCC Article 9 to the contrary).