The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held, in a split decision, on March 22, 2010, that secured creditors do not have a statutory right to credit bid1 their debt at an asset sale conducted under a “cramdown” reorganization plan. In re Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC, et al., --- F.3d ----, 2010 WL 1006647 (3d Cir. March 22, 2010) (2-1).

On Nov. 10, 2009, a Pennsylvania district court held that secured creditors do not have an absolute right to credit bid1 their debt under the Bankruptcy Code (the “Code”) in an asset sale conducted pursuant to a “cramdown” plan of reorganization that proposes to provide the secured creditors with the “indubitable equivalent” of their claims. In re Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC, Civil Action 09-00178 at 57 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 10, 2009). This decision is on appeal to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.

Facts

In a recent decision, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware allowed the collateral agent for senior lenders to credit bid for the debtors’ assets even though all of the senior lenders had not authorized the bid. One of the senior lenders had objected to the group’s acquisition of the debtors’ assets by the credit bid. In re GWLS Holdings, Inc., 2009 WL 453110 (Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 23, 2009) (Walsh, J.).

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held on March 25, 2009, that a bankruptcy court had improperly surcharged property in the hands of a credit bidding asset buyer with the expenses of the judicial sale. In re Skuna River Lumber, LLC, __F.3d ___, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 6175 (5th Cir. 3/25/09). Explaining that the “bankruptcy court had no jurisdiction to take such action,” the Fifth Circuit also vacated the district court’s improper ruling that the bankruptcy judge could enter a personal judgment against the asset buyer. Id., at *9.  

Facts

Creditors often consider filing an involuntary bankruptcy petition against their financially distressed debtors. Before using this extraordinary remedy, a creditor should evaluate whether it will achieve a valid business objective. Additionally, each creditor should evaluate whether there is a valid basis to support the filing. When the debtor's bankruptcy is appropriate, it can be a valuable step in maximizing a creditor's recovery. But the stakes are high.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently dismissed an appeal from “the sale of legal claims” as “statutorily moot” under Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) § 363(m) because the appellants “had not obtained a stay” of the effectiveness of the sale order pending appeal. In re Pursuit Capital Mgmt., LLC, 2017 U.S. App. Lexis 20889 (3d Cir. Oct. 24, 2017). According to the court, “we cannot give [the appellants] the remedy they seek without affecting the validity of the sale.” Id., at *37.

Relevance

The Ninth Circuit’s Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (the “BAP”) held on July 18, 2008, that the Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) did not authorize a bankruptcy court’s approving the sale of a debtor’s property free and clear of a junior lien outside the reorganization plan context. In re PW, LLC __ B.R. __, 2008 WL 2840659 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. July 18, 2008). It directed the bankruptcy court to ascertain on remand whether state law permitted a court to compel the junior lienholder to release its lien in exchange for payment of less than the face value of its claim. Id., at *13-*16.

The Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) “requires the use of replacement value rather than a hypothetical [foreclosure] value … that the reorganization is designed to avoid,” held a divided U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on May 26, 2017.

The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit recently held that an oversecured lender holds at least an unsecured claim for contractual prepayment penalties against a solvent debtor. UPS Capital Business Credit v. Gencarelli (In re Gencarelli), 2007 BL 91656 (1st Cir., Aug. 30, 2007). As the court explained, "[t]his is a difficult question that has significant ramifications for the commercial lending industry." Id. at 16.

A Chapter 11 debtor’s financial advisers were entitled to a “Success Fee” based on a percentage of a $50-million “debt-to-equity conversion,” held a split U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on May 4, 2016. In re Valence Technology, Inc., 2016 WL 2587109, *1 (5th Cir. May 4, 2016) (2-1). Key to the opinion was the parties’ concession that the “debt-to-equity conversion qualified as a Private Placement under [their] engagement agreements.” Id., at n.1.