On August 31, 2012, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit published its first decision expressly adopting an abuse of discretion standard for reviewing equitable mootness determinations by district courts. In In re Charter Communications, Inc., the Second Circuit followed the Third and Tenth Circuits, while also reaffirming the Second Circuit’s rebuttable presumption of equitable mootness upon substantial consummation of a debtor’s plan.
In Motorola, Inc. v. Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (In re Iridium Operating LLC), 478 F.3d 452 (2d Cir. 2007), the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (the “Committee”) and the debtors’ lenders sought approval of a settlement prior to confirmation of a plan of reorganization. While the Court concluded that many aspects of the settlement might otherwise be approved, it found that a provision that distributed funds in violation of the absolute priority rule lacked sufficient justification.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals recently issued an opinion that potentially broadens the proximate cause element of claims brought under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). RICO’s proximate cause element requires a plaintiff to allege facts plausibly establishing that there is a “direct relationship” between the claimed injury and the defendant’s conduct in violation of RICO.
The Bankruptcy Code sets forth the relative priority of claims against a debtor and the waterfall in which such claims are typically paid. In order for a court to confirm a plan over a dissenting class of creditors – what is commonly called a “cram-down” – the Bankruptcy Code demands thateither (i) the dissenting class receives the full value of its claim, or (ii) no classes junior to that class receive any property under the plan on account of their junior claims or interests. This is known as the “absolute priority rule.”
On January 18, 2017, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued an opinion in the case of Trikona Advisers Limited v. Chugh, No. 14-975-cv, 2017 WL 191936 (2d Cir. Jan. 18, 2017), thwarting an attempt to expand the scope of Chapter 15 of Title 11 of the United States Code (the “Bankruptcy Code”). Specifically, the Second Circuit held, among other things, that Chapter 15 does not prevent a U.S. District Court from giving preclusive effect to the findings of a foreign court presiding over an insolvency proceeding where the action pending in the U.S.
On September 26, 2014, in the Farnum case (Krys v. Farnum Place, LLC (In re Fairfield Sentry Ltd.), 768 F.3d 239 (2d Cir. 2014)) the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that Bankruptcy Code section 363 review applied to a transfer of a Securities Investor Protection Act (“SIPA”) claim held by an off-shore entity in foreign liquidation proceedings recognized in the United States. The decision is significant for two reasons.
A bankruptcy court decision recently detailed how courts applying Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) § 303(i) can sanction creditors who “abuse… the power given to [them]… to file an involuntary bankruptcy petition.” In re Anmuth Holdings LLC, 2019 WL 1421169, * 1 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2019).
On Sept. 12, 2013, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court’s decision to deny payment of a make-whole premium (the “Make-Whole Amount”) to bondholders under three separate indentures (the “Indentures”) based on the plain language of those agreements. U.S. Bank Trust Nat’l Ass’n v. AMR Corp. et al. (In re AMR Corp.), __ F.3d __, 2013 WL 4840474 (2d Cir. Sept. 12, 2013) (“In re AMR Corp. II”).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on Aug. 30, 2007, affirmed the dismissal of a lender liability class action brought by employees of a defunct originator and seller of mortgages and home equity loans. 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 20791 (2d Cir. August 30, 2007). Agreeing with the district court, the Second Circuit held that the lender was not an "employer" within the meaning of the Worker Adjustment & Retraining Notification Act ("WARN Act"), and thus was not liable to the employees for the sudden loss of their jobs. Id., at *2.