When a creditor seeks equitable relief in a bankruptcy court, must the court always follow common law principles of equity? Not according to several courts, including the Second Circuit. Concluding that the granting of equitable remedies may circumvent the Bankruptcy Code's equitable distribution system, courts have limited the application of equitable remedies in the bankruptcy context.
Two recent Federal appeals court decisions — one issued by the Fifth, the other by the Second Circuit — illustrate the dangers of careless drafting of bankruptcy and reorganization plans. In the Fifth Circuit decision, a drafting error prevented a company reorganized under Chapter 11 from suing the administrators of its property during its bankruptcy for fraud, breach of fiduciary duty and negligence, thereby potentially depriving its creditors of bankruptcy assets.
On July 22, 2008, the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed denial of the motion of Parmalat S.p.A. ("New Parmalat") to extend an injunction provided to its predecessor, Parmalat Finanziaria, S.p.A., under Bankruptcy Code section 304, against securities fraud actions.1 Although the appeal addressed the issue of injunction in the context of superseded Bankruptcy Code section 304, this decision and the underlying lower court opinion signify other issues of broader import, including the need for careful plan drafting and the complexities inherent in cross-border cases.
In Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors v. Halifax Fund, L.P. (In re Applied Theory Corp.),1 the Second Circuit, in a per curiam opinion, held that an official committee of unsecured creditors (the "Committee"), under the circumstances, did not have the right to commence an adversary proceeding seeking the equitable subordination of claims held by insiders of a Chapter 11 debtor. The Applied Theory court rebuffed the Committee's characterization of its claim as a direct claim that the Committee could prosecute without the bankruptcy court's permission.
Equitable mootness is a doctrine grounded in equity pursuant to which an appeals court will dismiss an appeal of a bankruptcy order — even if effective relief could conceivably have been granted — because the implementation of such relief (e.g., the reversal of a bankruptcy court order) would be inequitable to third parties. This doctrine may be applied to achieve the necessary finality of bankruptcy orders and decisions that is required to effectuate the successful, expedient reorganization of debtors in bankruptcy.2
In Motorola, Inc. v. Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (In re Iridium Operating LLC, 478 F.3d 452 (2d Cir. 2007), the Second Circuit held that the most important factor for a bankruptcy court to consider in approving a pre-plan settlement pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9019 is whether the settlement’s distribution scheme complies with the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme. Prior to this ruling, courts in the Second Circuit generally considered the following factors when approving settlement agreements:
It is a unique characteristic of debt restructuring under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code that a majority of a class of creditors can accept a modification of the terms of the debts owed to the class members, as provided in a plan of reorganization, and thereby bind non-accepting class members.[1] The ordinary route to confirming a Chapter 11 plan is to obtain its acceptance by a majority of every impaired class of creditors and equity hold
In United States v. Yalincak, No. 11-5446 (2nd Cir. Apr. 10, 2017) (Calabresi, Raggi, Lynch), the Second Circuit addressed a complicated issue of appellate procedure in the course of a decision on the law of restitution. Specifically, the Court weighed in on when a district court’s order crediting a defendant funds against his restitution obligations becomes a final, appealable order that cannot be revisited by the district court.
In March, we reported on a brief filed by the Solicitor General recommending denial of a petition for certiorari filed by Tribune creditors seeking Supreme Court review of the Second Circuit ruling dismissing their state-law fraudulent transfer claims.
In January 2020 we reported that, after the reconsideration suggested by two Supreme Court justices and revisions to account for the Supreme Court’s Merit Management decision,[1] the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stood by its origina