It is a unique characteristic of debt restructuring under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code that a majority of a class of creditors can accept a modification of the terms of the debts owed to the class members, as provided in a plan of reorganization, and thereby bind non-accepting class members.[1] The ordinary route to confirming a Chapter 11 plan is to obtain its acceptance by a majority of every impaired class of creditors and equity hold

In Short

The Situation: In In re MPM Silicones, L.L.C., secured noteholders argued that replacement notes distributed to them under a cram-down chapter 11 plan should bear market-rate interest rather than the lower formula rate proposed in the plan and that they were entitled to a make-whole premium.

In Momentive Performance Materials Inc. v. BOKF, NA (In re MPM Silicones, L.L.C.), 2017 BL 376794 (2d Cir. Oct. 27, 2017) ("Momentive"), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in a long-anticipated decision, affirmed a number of lower court rulings on hot-button bankruptcy issues, including allowance (or, in this case, denial) of a claim for a "make-whole" premium and contractual subordination of junior notes.

The United States Second Circuit has issued its ruling in the Momentive Performance Materials casesresolving three separate appeals by different groups of creditors of Judge Bricetti’s judgment in the United States District Court of the Southern District of New York, which affirmed

Courts and professionals have wrestled for years with the appropriate approach to use in setting the interest rate when a debtor imposes a chapter 11 plan on a secured creditor and pays the creditor the value of its collateral through deferred payments under section 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II) of the Bankruptcy Code. Secured lenders gained a major victory on October 20, 2017, when the Second Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that a market rate of interest is preferred to a so-called “formula approach” in chapter 11, when an efficient market exists.

In recent years, courts have become increasingly critical of the doctrine of equitable mootness, a judicially created abstention doctrine that allows appellate courts to dismiss appeals from a bankruptcy court’s confirmation order in certain circumstances. Although the doctrine is meant to be applied only sparingly, to avoid unscrambling complex reorganizations on appeal, it has been invoked in noncomplex cases or where limited relief is practicable. As a result, some circuit courts have urged a more limited application of the doctrine.

Section 510(b) of the Bankruptcy Code provides a mechanism designed to preserve the creditor/shareholder risk allocation paradigm by categorically subordinating most types of claims asserted against a debtor by equityholders in respect of their equity holdings. However, courts do not always agree on the scope of this provision in attempting to implement its underlying policy objectives. In In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., 2017 WL 1718438 (2d Cir.

In the March/April 2013 edition of the Business Restructuring Review, we reported on an opinion by the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York concluding that a chapter 15 debtor’s sale of claims against Bernard Madoff’s defunct brokerage company was not subject to review as an asset sale under section 363(b) of the Bankruptcy Code.

On May 8, 2017, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Florida entered an order compelling production of attorney-client communications between Regions Bank and its counsel, finding that Regions had put those communications “at issue” by raising a good faith affirmative defense under 11 U.S.C. § 548(c) in response to a fraudulent transfer claim brought against it. Welch v. Regions Bank (In re Mongelluzzi), No. 8:14-ap-00653-CED (Bankr. M.D. Fla. May 8, 2017), ECF No. 319 (Delano, J.) (herein Mongelluzzi).

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently affirmed the dismissal of LIBOR-manipulation fraud claims brought by a group of hotel-related entities and their investor against a bank and two of its subsidiaries.

In so ruling, the Second Circuit held that:

(a) the borrower and related entities lacked standing to sue because they failed to list their potential claims in their bankruptcy case and the claims were barred by the doctrine of judicial estoppel; and

(b) the claims of the investor and guarantors were untimely and barred by the law of the case.