In Motorola, Inc. v. Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (In re Iridium Operating LLC), 478 F.3d 452 (2d Cir. 2007), the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (the “Committee”) and the debtors’ lenders sought approval of a settlement prior to confirmation of a plan of reorganization. While the Court concluded that many aspects of the settlement might otherwise be approved, it found that a provision that distributed funds in violation of the absolute priority rule lacked sufficient justification.

In Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors v. Halifax Fund, L.P. (In re Applied Theory Corp.),1 the Second Circuit, in a per curiam opinion, held that an official committee of unsecured creditors (the "Committee"), under the circumstances, did not have the right to commence an adversary proceeding seeking the equitable subordination of claims held by insiders of a Chapter 11 debtor. The Applied Theory court rebuffed the Committee's characterization of its claim as a direct claim that the Committee could prosecute without the bankruptcy court's permission.

While many amendments to bond indentures can be made without consent from all bondholders, “non-impairment” clauses provide that the indenture may not be amended or restructured in any way that will affect or impair a bondholder’s right to receive principal and interest when due without unanimous consent.

In a decision in In re Enron Corp., et al., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63129, No. 05-01025 (S.D.N.Y. August 27, 2007), the Honorable Shira Scheindlin, United States District Judge for the Southern District of New York, held that the sale of a claim that is subject to equitable subordination under section 510(c) or disallowance under section 502(d) of the Bankruptcy Code may insulate the claim from subordination and disallowance when asserted against the buyer of the claim. At first blush the decision may be, and has been, read by some to offer relief and clarity to distressed debt investors.

The power to alter the relative priority of claims due to the misconduct of one creditor that causes injury to others is an important tool in the array of remedies available to a bankruptcy court in exercising its broad equitable powers. However, unlike provisions in the Bankruptcy Code that expressly authorize a bankruptcy trustee or chapter 11 debtor-in-possession (“DIP ”) to seek the imposition of equitable remedies, such as lien or transfer avoidance, the statutory authority for equitable subordination—section 510(c)—does not specify exactly who may seek subordination of a claim.

In the summer of 2007, we reported on Gredd v. Bear, Stearns Securities Corp. (In re Manhattan Investment Fund, Ltd.),1 decided by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York.

The next time you negotiate a settlement payment with a financially troubled party, you may want to keep in mind an ancient term related to livestock herding: earmarking. The concept may be somewhat antiquated, but the Second Circuit has recently confirmed that it is still viable – and can help you keep the settlement payment if the other party later files for bankruptcy.

In an important recent decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, testing the outer reaches of a bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction, In re Johns Manville Corp., 06-2099 (2d Cir. Feb. 15, 2008), the court considered whether claims that are not derivative of a debtor’s liability, but rather seek to recover directly from an insurer for its own alleged misconduct, can be enjoined by the “channeling” mechanism developed by the bankruptcy court.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has ruled that the Johns-Manville bankruptcy court did not have jurisdiction to enjoin direct action claims asserted against Travelers entities that are predicted on an independent duty owed by Travelers, that do not claim against the res of the Manville estate, and that seek damages unrelated to and in excess of Manville's insurance proceeds. Johns-Manville Corp. v. Chubb Indemnity Ins. Co., --- F.3d ---, 2008 WL 399010 (2d Cir. Feb. 15, 2008).

The Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (“WARN”) requires an employer to give 60 days’ advance written notice prior to a plant closing or mass layoff. Frequently, as a company encounters financial distress—a situation that often leads to a plant closing or mass layoff— creditors exercise greater control over the entity in an attempt to recover debts owed to them. When the faltering company fails to provide the requisite WARN notice, terminated employees often assert that WARN liability should attach to such creditors. In Coppola v. Bear, Stearns & Co.