On May 20, 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a ruling of key significance for trademark licensing and for acquisitions, investments, financings and other transactions in which trademark licenses are a key value driver. In Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC,[1] the Court held, 8-1, that where the licensor of a trademark rejects a trademark license in bankruptcy, the rejection does not deprive the licensee of its rights to use the licensed trademark(s).

A bankruptcy court properly denied a bank's motion to compel arbitration of a debtor's asserted violation of the court's discharge injunction, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held on March 7, 2018. In re Anderson, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 5703, 20 (2d Cir. Mar. 7, 2018). Finding a purported "inherent conflict between arbitration of [the debtor's] claim and the Bankruptcy Code," the Second Circuit reasoned that the bankruptcy court "properly considered the conflicting policies in accordance with law." Id., quoting In re United States Lines, Inc., 197 F.3d 631, 641 (2d Cir.

The Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) “requires the use of replacement value rather than a hypothetical [foreclosure] value … that the reorganization is designed to avoid,” held a divided U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on May 26, 2017.

A Chapter 11 debtor’s financial advisers were entitled to a “Success Fee” based on a percentage of a $50-million “debt-to-equity conversion,” held a split U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on May 4, 2016. In re Valence Technology, Inc., 2016 WL 2587109, *1 (5th Cir. May 4, 2016) (2-1). Key to the opinion was the parties’ concession that the “debt-to-equity conversion qualified as a Private Placement under [their] engagement agreements.” Id., at n.1.

A “bank [making a secured rescue loan] had information that should have created the requisite suspicion … to conduct a diligent search for possible dirt” — i.e., whether the debtor had the right to pledge $312 million of customer securities, held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit on Jan. 8, 2016.In re Sentinel Management Group, Inc., 2016 WL 98601, at *2 (7th Cir. Jan. 8, 2016) [“Sentinel V”]. The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court, voided the defendant bank’s lien as a fraudulent transfer, and rejected the bank’s good faith defense.

Following a long line of cases preceding it, the English court in Re Van Gansewinkel Groep BV (‘VGG’) 1 has sanctioned a (solvent) English scheme of arrangement (‘Scheme’) under the Companies Act 2006 (the ‘Companies Act’) proposed by a group of foreign companies whose COMI2 and assets were located outside of England (‘foreign companies’).

This Alert is one of a series published by Schulte Roth & Zabel that analyzes the report released on Dec. 8, 2014 (“Report”) by the American Bankruptcy Institute Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11 (“Commission”), which recommended numerous changes to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (“Bankruptcy Code”).

The United States Supreme Court, on July 1, 2014, granted a petition for certiorari in an important Seventh Circuit case limiting the power of bankruptcy courts to decide property disputes. Wellness International Network, Ltd. et al. v. Sharif, 727 F.3d 751 (7th Cir. 2013). The Seventh Circuit had held last year that the bankruptcy court lacked the constitutional authority to determine whether purported trust assets were property of the debtor’s estate.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held on July 30, 2013, that a reorganized Chapter 11 debtor could reopen its closed case, enabling the debtor assignee to enforce a purchase option in a real property lease despite the lease’s “anti-assignment provisions.” In re Lazy Days’ RV Center Inc., 2013 WL 3886735, *5 (3d Cir. July 30, 2013).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, on Oct. 22, 2012, held that $1.6 million in political contributions made to five different political committees by Ponzi scheme defendants between 2000 and 2008 were fraudulent transfers made “with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors” under the Texas version of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. Janvey v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, Inc., et al., 2012 WL 5207460 ___ F.3d ___ (5th Cir. 2012).