The Supreme Court recently addressed two bankruptcy issues. In its opinion, the Court resolved a circuit split regarding the breadth of the safe harbor provision which protects certain transfers by financial institutions in connection with a securities contract. In Village at Lakeridge, the Court weighed in on the scope of appellate review and whether a bankruptcy court’s factual determination should be reviewed for clear error or de novo. These decisions are notable because they provide guidance on previously murky issues of bankruptcy law.

Earlier this month, the Supreme Court announced that it will review the scope of Bankruptcy Code section 546(e)’s safe harbor provision. Section 546(e) protects from avoidance those transfers that are made “by or to (or for the benefit of)” a financial institution, except where there is actual fraud. The safe harbor is intended to ensure the stability of the securities market in the event of corporate restructurings.

As noted in a recent Distressing Matters post, the United States Supreme Court in In re Jevic Holding Corp. held that debtors cannot use structured dismissals to make payments to creditors in violation of ordinary bankruptcy distribution priority rules.

In 2015, Distressing Matters reported on the Third Circuit’s decision in In re Jevic Holding Corp., wherein that panel ruled that, in rare circumstances, bankruptcy courts may approve the distribution of settlement proceeds in a manner that violates the Bankruptcy Code’s statutory priority scheme.

In an earlier blog piece we reported on the Third Circuit’s 2015 decision in In re Jevic Holding Corp. where the Court approved a settlement, implemented through a structured dismissal, which allowed junior creditors to receive a distribution prior to senior creditors being paid in full.

A few thoughts on Tuesday’s oral arguments before the U.S. Supreme Court in the litigation over whether Puerto Rico’s Public Corporations Debt Enforcement and Recovery Act, an insolvency statute for certain of its government instrumentalities, is void, as the lower federal courts held, under Section 903 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code:

It is said that muddy water is best cleared by leaving it be.  The Supreme Court’s December 4 decision to review the legality of Puerto Rico’s local bankruptcy law, the Recovery Act, despite a well-reasoned First Circuit Court of Appeals opinion affirming the U.S. District Court in San Juan’s decision voiding the Recovery Act on the grounds that it conflicts with Section 903 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, suggests, at a minimum, that at least four of the Justices deemed the questions raised too interesting to let the First Circuit have the last word.

On April 29, 2013, the Supreme Court of the United States declined to hear an appeal of the Second Circuit's decision dismissing, as equitably moot, appeals arising out of the bankruptcy of Charter Communications and let stand the opinion in In re Charter Communications, Inc., 691 F.3d 476 (2d Cir. 2012). As a result, the application of the equitable mootness doctrine, as it applies to bankruptcy appeals, will continue to vary among jurisdictions.

United States Supreme Court

Washington, D.C.

November 3, 2009

On June 16, 2008, Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion of the court in Florida Department of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc. In a 7-2 decision, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit and held that § 1146(a) provides an exemption to state stamp taxes only where a sale occurs pursuant to a plan that has been confirmed, and did not properly apply to a case where the plan was confirmed several months after the bankruptcy court approved the sale.