Alan Bennett and Crispin Jones successfully acted for Mr Dowling in his application to set aside a Statutory Demand served on him by Promontoria (Arrow) Limited ("Promontoria") in the sum of €6,338,675.93. The decision has wide reaching implications for creditors seeking to rely on guarantees.
The recent case of Mervyn’s LLC v Lubert-Adler Group IV, LLC, et al. (In re Mervyn’s Holdings, LLC),1 serves as a warning to sellers and equity firms participating in leveraged buyouts to be wary of the effect such buyouts will have on creditors of the target company.
Debt for Equity Exchanges Outside Bankruptcy
SCHLEICHER v. WENDT (August 20, 2010)
Conseco was a large financial services company traded on the New York Stock Exchange. It filed for bankruptcy in 2002 and successfully reorganized. This securities-fraud claim was filed against Conseco managers who are alleged to have made false statements prior to the bankruptcy. Then-District Judge Hamilton (S.D. Ind.) certified a class. Defendants appeal.
The year 2009 set a record for defaults and restructurings. Ownership of companies changed rapidly and, given the freeze up in capital markets, most of the new capital structures were significantly deleveraged, leaving little role for pre-existing sponsors and other equity holders of troubled companies. Halfway through 2010, even though actual bankruptcies have declined, restructuring continues through an amendment and forbearance process that is driven by the potential consequences to stakeholders in a court supervised restructuring.
In a highly anticipated decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently affirmed a bankruptcy court order dismissing a chapter 11 case filed by a corporation without obtaining—as required by its corporate charter—the consent of a preferred shareholder that was also controlled by a creditor of the corporation. In Franchise Services of North America, Inc. v. Macquarie Capital (USA), Inc. (In re Franchise Services of North America, Inc.), 891 F.3d 198 (5th Cir.
There is a lot of chatter around the water cooler about how falling energy prices puts energy companies and service companies into distress, and—importantly for private equity investors with liquidity—provides an opportunity to acquire energy assets at distressed prices. In part one of this posting, I provided a very basic hypothetical to help la
As the economy continues to emerge from the global recession in the late 2000s, one of the prevailing trends we have seen is the continuation of challenges to distressed investors that have employed a “loan-to-own” strategy. Boiled to its basics, the loan to own strategy is a method of investing by a distressed investor — frequently a private equity or hedge fund — that acquires the secured debt of a borrower at a discount (often deep) with the hope of either being paid at par or using the par value of the secured debt to acquire the company.
In the world of private equity, vast sums of money are raised by private investors who pool their money into collective funds in order to acquire companies, i.e., a “portfolio company”, with the goal of eventually flipping the portfolio company at a significant profit. Sometimes, however, that bet goes wrong, and the portfolio company is sold at a loss or, worse, liquidated in bankruptcy.
On July 24, 2013 the First Circuit Court of Appeals, applying an “investment plus” test, concluded that a Sun Capital private equity investment fund was engaged in a “trade or business” for purposes of determining whether the fund could be jointly and severally liable under ERISA for the unfunded pension withdrawal liability of the portfolio company.1 Two Sun Capital investment funds, conveniently named Sun Capital Partners III, LP (“Fund III”) and Sun Capital Partners IV, LP, (“Fund IV”) (the “Sun Funds”) collectively owned 100 percent of Scott Brass, Inc.