In a case of apparent first impression, U.S. District Court Judge Alan S. Gold recently held in In re Wellington Vision, Inc., No. 06-80446, __ B.R. ___, 2007 WL 762398 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 20, 2007), that a franchisee in chapter 11 cannot assume (i.e., retain) a franchise agreement that grants a nonexclusive trademark license, leaving the franchisor free to terminate the agreement.
The Ninth Circuit’s Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP) recently upheld the disallowance of a credit union’s claims after the credit union’s “disgruntled employee” failed to file the proofs of claim before the claims bar date.
The case of Spokane Law Enforcement Federal Credit Union v. Barker (In re Barker) serves as a cautionary tale—reminding creditors and their attorneys of the importance of timely filing proofs of claim.
An Illinois appellate court, applying Indiana and federal law, has held that neither a bankruptcy exclusion nor an insured versus insured exclusion applied to bar coverage for claims brought by a bankruptcy trustee. Yessenow v. Exec. Risk Indem., Inc., 2011 WL 2623307 (Ill. App. Ct. June 30, 2011).
Two years ago in Stern v Marshall, the Supreme Court surprised many observers by placing constitutional limits on the jurisdiction of the United States Bankruptcy Courts. The Court, in limiting the ability of a bankruptcy court judge to render a final judgment on a counterclaim against a party who had filed a claim against a debtor’s bankruptcy estate, re-opened separation of powers issues that most bankruptcy practitioners had thought settled since the mid-1980s. While the
On June 23, 2011, the US Supreme Court issued a narrowly-divided decision in Stern v. Marshall, limiting Bankruptcy Court jurisdiction over certain types of claims. The Court found that while the Bankruptcy Court was statutorily authorized to enter final judgment on a tortious interference counterclaim (as a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C)), it was not constitutionally authorized to do so.
The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded an Oregon bankruptcy court’s order designating recently acquired claims of a secured creditor for bad faith, holding that a bad faith finding requires “something more.” Specifically, the Court found that a bankruptcy court may not designate claims for bad faith simply because (1) a creditor offers to purchase only a subset of available claims in order to block a plan of reorganization, and/or (2) blocking the plan will adversely impact the remaining creditors.Pacific Western Bank, et al. v.
Circuit held that when a chapter 11 debtor cures a default under its loan agreements, the debtor is required to pay default interest as required by the loan documents, rather than at the non-default rate.
In its recent decision in Meruelo Maddux Properties, Inc.,1 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that an entity that meets the definition of a “single real estate” debtor under the Bankruptcy Code may not escape the consequences of such designation simply because it is a subsidiary of a group of companies with integrated and intertwined relationships among them. The decision may provide powerful rights not only to lenders to such entities in general, but could significantly enhance the rights of creditors of real estate owning single purpose entities.
Industry observers have been waiting to see when bank failures arising out of the recent financial crisis would produce a wave of Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) litigation similar to that seen in the early 1990s after the savings and loan crisis. With its second suit in recent months, the FDIC has shown that it will aggressively pursue claims against directors and officers in connection with failed depository institutions.
The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently affirmed the dismissal of an adversary proceeding without leave to amend, holding that:
(a) the debtors failed to state a claim for wrongful foreclosure under California law;
(b) the debtors failed to state a claim for breach of contract or breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing because they were not third-party beneficiaries of the pooling and servicing agreement;