The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has held, under California law, that an insurer had no duty to defend an insured actuarial services firm in litigation alleging that the insured’s reserve reviews and rate level recommendations contributed to the insolvency of a medical malpractice self-insurance fund. Zurich Specialties London Limited v. Bickerstaff, Whatley, Ryan & Burkhalter, Inc., 2011 WL 1118463 (9th Cir. Mar. 28, 2011).

The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Ninth Circuit has affirmed the bankruptcy court’s grant of a motion by a debtor’s sole director to modify the automatic stay to allow payment of defense costs under the A-side coverage of the debtor’s directors and officers liability insurance policy. In re MILA, Inc., 2010 WL 455328 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Jan. 29, 2010).

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that an insured vs. insured exclusion bars coverage for a suit by a debtor-in-possession against former directors and officers of the company. Biltmore Assocs. v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., No. 06-16417, 2009 WL 1976071 (9th Cir. July 10, 2009). The court rejected the argument that the debtor-in-possession was a different legal entity from the pre-bankruptcy company insured under the policy.

Two years ago in Stern v Marshall, the Supreme Court surprised many observers by placing constitutional limits on the jurisdiction of the United States Bankruptcy Courts. The Court, in limiting the ability of a bankruptcy court judge to render a final judgment on a counterclaim against a party who had filed a claim against a debtor’s bankruptcy estate, re-opened separation of powers issues that most bankruptcy practitioners had thought settled since the mid-1980s. While the

On June 23, 2011, the US Supreme Court issued a narrowly-divided decision in Stern v. Marshall, limiting Bankruptcy Court jurisdiction over certain types of claims. The Court found that while the Bankruptcy Court was statutorily authorized to enter final judgment on a tortious interference counterclaim (as a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C)), it was not constitutionally authorized to do so.

The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded an Oregon bankruptcy court’s order designating recently acquired claims of a secured creditor for bad faith, holding that a bad faith finding requires “something more.” Specifically, the Court found that a bankruptcy court may not designate claims for bad faith simply because (1) a creditor offers to purchase only a subset of available claims in order to block a plan of reorganization, and/or (2) blocking the plan will adversely impact the remaining creditors.Pacific Western Bank, et al. v.

Circuit held that when a chapter 11 debtor cures a default under its loan agreements, the debtor is required to pay default interest as required by the loan documents, rather than at the non-default rate.

In its recent decision in Meruelo Maddux Properties, Inc.,¹ the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that an entity that meets the definition of a “single real estate” debtor under the Bankruptcy Code may not escape the consequences of such designation simply because it is a subsidiary of a group of companies with integrated and intertwined relationships among them. The decision may provide powerful rights not only to lenders to such entities in general, but could significantly enhance the rights of creditors of real estate owning single purpose entities.

Industry observers have been waiting to see when bank failures arising out of the recent financial crisis would produce a wave of Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) litigation similar to that seen in the early 1990s after the savings and loan crisis. With its second suit in recent months, the FDIC has shown that it will aggressively pursue claims against directors and officers in connection with failed depository institutions.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently held that if a creditor wishes to participate in the distribution of a debtor’s assets under Chapter 13, it must timely file a proof of claim, and the debtor’s acknowledgment of the debt owed to the creditor does not relieve the creditor of this affirmative duty.

A copy of the opinion is available at: Link to Opinion.