In the first opinion authored by Justice Elena Kagan, the Supreme Court ruled that a Chapter 13 debtor may not deduct the “ownership costs” of a vehicle under the means test when he owes no further payments on the vehicle, affirming a decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The 8-1 opinion featured a pro-debtor dissent by Justice Scalia.

1 Loranger v Jones, 184 Cal App 4th 847 (3d Dist May 2010)

Jones, a licensed contractor, had a workers' compensation policy covering his employees. Jones unknowingly used an unlicensed subcontractor and knowingly permitted two minors without work permits, and another person without a contractor's license, to help perform work for Loranger. Loranger refused to pay the final invoice and Jones filed suit for breach of contract. Loranger cross-complained alleging defects and sought disgorgement of monies paid.  

People’s Capital and Leasing Corp. v. BIG3D, Inc. (In re BIG3D, Inc.), 438 B.R. 214 (9th Cir. BAP 2010)

CASE SNAPSHOT

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has held, under California law, that an insurer had no duty to defend an insured actuarial services firm in litigation alleging that the insured’s reserve reviews and rate level recommendations contributed to the insolvency of a medical malpractice self-insurance fund. Zurich Specialties London Limited v. Bickerstaff, Whatley, Ryan & Burkhalter, Inc., 2011 WL 1118463 (9th Cir. Mar. 28, 2011).

The U.S. Supreme Court’s October 2010 Term (which extends from October 2010 to October 2011, although the Court hears argument only until June or July) officially got underway on October 4, three days after Elena Kagan was formally sworn in as the Court’s 112th Justice and one of three female Justices sitting on the Court.

The enduring impact of the Great Recession on businesses, individuals, municipalities, and even sovereign nations has figured prominently in world headlines during the last three years. Comparatively absent from the lede, however, has been the plight of charitable and other nonprofit entities that depend in large part on the largesse of donors who themselves have been less able or less willing to provide eleemosynary institutions with badly needed sources of capital in the current economic climate.

Although it has been described as an “extraordinary remedy,” the ability of a bankruptcy court to order the substantive consolidation of related debtor-entities in bankruptcy (if circumstances so dictate) is relatively uncontroversial, as an appropriate exercise of a bankruptcy court’s broad (albeit nonstatutory) equitable powers. By contrast, considerable controversy surrounds the far less common practice of ordering consolidation of a debtor in bankruptcy with a nondebtor.

The US Supreme Court has ruled in Stern v. Marshall (June 23, 2011) that a bankruptcy court lacks jurisdiction to render final judgment on a bankruptcy estate’s compulsory counterclaim against a creditor arising under common law, despite a statutory grant of jurisdiction.

In a decision that may create serious problems for bankruptcy case administration, the Supreme Court this morning invalidated part of the Bankruptcy Court jurisdictional scheme. Stern v. Marshall, No. 10-179, 564 U.S. ___ (June 23, 2011). Specifically, the Court held that the Bankruptcy Courts cannot issue final judgments on garden variety state law claims that are asserted as counterclaims by the debtor or trustee against creditors who have filed proofs of claim in the bankruptcy case.

On June 22, 2011, the Supreme Court decided Stern v. Marshall, No. 10-179, holding that the Bankruptcy Court had the statutory authority under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C) to enter judgment on a counterclaim that the bankruptcy estate of Vickie Lynn Marshall (a/k/a Anna Nicole Smith) asserted against E.