In In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, Case No. 15-35572 (9th Cir. Sept. 12, 2017), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a bankruptcy trustee may use Section 363(f) of the Bankruptcy Code to sell real property free and clear of unexpired leases without affording the non-debtor lessees the right to retain possession of the property.
In First Southern Nat’l Bank v. Sunnyslope Hous. LP (In re Sunnyslope Hous. LP), 2017 BL 216965 (9th Cir. June 23, 2017), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held en banc that, in determining whether a chapter 11 plan may be confirmed over the objection of a secured creditor, the creditor’s collateral must be valued in accordance with the debtor’s intended use of the property, even if the property would realize more in a foreclosure sale because of the existence of restrictive covenants.
The ability of a trustee or chapter 11 debtor-in-possession ("DIP") to sell bankruptcy estate assets "free and clear" of competing interests in the property has long been recognized as one of the most important advantages of a bankruptcy filing as a vehicle for restructuring a debtor’s balance sheet and generating value. Still, section 363(f) of the Bankruptcy Code, which delineates the circumstances under which an asset can be sold free and clear of "any interest in such property," has generated a fair amount of controversy.
Avoiding a fraudulent transfer to the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) in bankruptcy has become easier, or at least clearer, as a result of a recent unanimous decision by a panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Zazzali v. United States (In re DBSI, Inc.), 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 16817 (9th Cir. Aug. 31, 2017).
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently affirmed final judgments against corporate borrowers and guarantors in three separate cases, holding that:
(a) the Nevada statute limiting the amount of the deficiency recoverable in a foreclosure action was preempted by federal law as applied to transferees of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC);
(b) the plaintiff bank had standing to enforce the loans it acquired from the FDIC;
(c) the bank was not issue-precluded from showing that the subject loans had been transferred to it;
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently held that, where husband and wife debtors fraudulently transferred assets, the creditor was entitled to the full sum the creditor would have recovered and was not limited to the amount of the collateralized debt.
In so ruling, the Ninth Circuit reversed a bankruptcy court and trial court judgment in the creditor’s favor that the debt was non-dischargeable due to the debtor’s fraud, but improperly limiting the non-dischargeable debt to only the collateralized amount.
Summary:
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently held that the Federal Foreclosure Bar’s prohibition on nonconsensual foreclosure of assets of the Federal Housing Finance Agency preempted Nevada’s superpriority lien provision and invalidated a homeowners association foreclosure sale that purported to extinguish Freddie Mac’s interest in the property.
A copy of the opinion is available at: Link to Opinion.
Two sections of the Bankruptcy Code addressing leases sometimes work in tandem with each other, but some courts are creating a conflict.
Section 363 gives bankruptcy courts the power to approve the sale of the assets of a bankruptcy debtor, free and clear of any liens, claims or interests in the property, under certain conditions.
Section 365 gives bankruptcy courts the power to approve the termination of unexpired leases of real estate or to approve their assumption and assignment, also under certain conditions.
The recent Spanish Peaks decision from the Ninth Circuit (covering Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon and Washington) deepens the split in case law on the ability to strip off leases in a landlord/borrower bankruptcy.