The Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York overseeing the Residential Capital (“ResCap”) cases issued an opinion on November 15, 2013 (the “Opinion”)2 allowing the unamortized interest associated with original issue discount (“OID”) that was generated in a fair market value exchange and claimed by ResCap’s junior secured noteholders (the “Holders”). While the OID ruling is only one component of the Opinion,3 it may have far reaching implications, as already evidenced in the pricing of other OID notes that were the product of fair market value exchanges.

Introduction

Introduction

A recent decision in the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (the “Court”) in the Lehman case has extended the unenforceability of ipso facto clauses to a provision triggered by the bankruptcy filing of an affiliate of a contractual party.

In a recent decision, the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York held that a purported debt held by an entity with a near-majority membership interest in the Debtor was actually equity disguised as a loan.

Background

A recent decision of the New York Court of Appeals, Sutton v. Pilevsky held that federal bankruptcy law does not preempt state law tortious interference claims against non-debtors who participated in a scheme that caused a debtor—in this case a bankruptcy remote special purpose entity—to breach contractual obligations intended to ensure that the entity remains a Special Purpose Entity (SPE) and to facilitate the lenders’ enforcement of remedies upon a future bankruptcy filing, if any.

A recent decision of the New York Court of Appeals, Sutton v. Pilevsky held that federal bankruptcy law does not preempt state law tortious interference claims against non-debtors who participated in a scheme that caused a debtor—in this case a bankruptcy remote special purpose entity—to breach contractual obligations intended to ensure that the entity remains a Special Purpose Entity (SPE) and to facilitate the lenders’ enforcement of remedies upon a future bankruptcy filing, if any.

A recent decision out of the District Court for the Southern District of New York may bring greater certainty to the interpretation of what constitutes a “financial institution” in connection with the safe harbor in section 546(e) of the bankruptcy code. The decision, In re Tribune Fraudulent Conveyance Litig., 2019 U.S. Dist. Lexis 69081 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.

The Circuit Court of the First Judicial Circuit in and for Santa Rosa County, Florida recently rejected a company’s argument that a purchase and sale agreement for the company’s future receivables constituted a “loan” that was unenforceable under New York usury law, because payment to the purchaser of the future receivables was not absolutely guaranteed, but instead contingent, and thus, not a loan subject to the law of usury.

The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York recently held that a confirmable Chapter 13 plan cannot both “vest” title to real property and “surrender” that property to a secured lender, and that the secured lender may refuse to accept the vesting in satisfaction of its claim.

Thus, the Court held that a debtor may not force the transfer of title in collateral to a secured creditor in satisfaction of the secured creditor’s claim, without the consent of the secured creditor.