Summary: In EPC Constructions India Ltd. v. Matix Fertilizers & Chemicals Ltd., the Supreme Court addressed whether holders of non-cumulative redeemable preference shares can initiate insolvency proceedings under Section 7 of the IBC, as financial creditors. The Court held that preference shareholders are not creditors and cannot trigger insolvency proceedings, as preference shares remain part of the share capital even upon maturity, and conversion of debt into preference shares permanently extinguishes the original creditor relationship.

The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (IBBI) has issued the Insolvency Professionals to act as IRPs, RPs, Liquidators and Bankruptcy Trustees (Recommendation) (Second) Guidelines, 2025, which will govern appointments for the period January 1, 2026 to June 30, 2026.

The insolvency framework governing real estate projects in India has undergone a significant transformation with the recognition of “Reverse CIRP”, a judicial innovation designed to protect homebuyers’ interests while ensuring completion of stalled real estate projects. This mechanism was recently endorsed by the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (“NCLAT”) in the Satish Chander Verma v. Grand Reality Private Limited^[1] ("Grand Reality Case").

The Supreme Court of India (“Supreme Court”), in Mansi Brar Fernandes vs. Shubha Sharma and Anr. inter alia held that ‘speculative investors’ cannot be permitted to initiate Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (“CIRP”) under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (“IBC”) and has laid down certain key principles and criteria for determining who a ‘speculative investor’ would be.

Brief facts

INTRODUCTION

The recent NCLT Kochi Bench judgment in Regional Provident Fund Commissioner vs.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India (“Supreme Court”), in the case of IL&FS Financial Services Ltd. vs. Adhunik Meghalaya Steels Pvt. Ltd.1, held that entries in a company’s balance sheet acknowledging outstanding borrowings constitute a valid acknowledgment of debt under Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (“Limitation Act”), even if the creditor is not specifically named within the balance sheet.

Background

This article examines whether a delay in implementing the Resolution Plan equates to failure of the plan or can timelines for implementation be extended?

Power to extend timelines