In an apparent case of first impression in Massachusetts, the US Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts recently held that an allonge must be physically affixed to the original promissory note to be effective.

The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals1 recently issued an opinion of importance in bankruptcy cases involving commercial real estate as the debtor’s only asset, such as a shopping center or office building.

While there has not been much good news for the mortgage banking industry coming out of bankruptcy courts in years, a recent opinion issued by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit provides not just good news, but very good news for mortgage lenders. The Fifth Circuit's opinion in Wilborn v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (In re Wilborn), 609 F.3d 748 (5th Cir.

On February 16th, the Third Circuit addressed an issue of first impression and held that the discounted cash flow method was the proper measure of damages under Bankruptcy Code Section 562 when a market price cannot be determined. The parties had entered into a $1.2 billion repurchase agreement for a portfolio of home mortgages. On the day the debtor defaulted, the distressed state of the credit markets made it commercially unreasonable for the purchaser to sell the portfolio and the market price would not reflect the asset's worth.

The United States Third Circuit Court of Appeals (the "Third Circuit") issued an opinion on February 16, 2011 in the American Home Mortgage chapter 11 proceeding that upheld a determination by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (the "Bankruptcy Court") on the valuation of a creditor’s claim that in connection with the termination and acceleration of a mortgage loan repurchase agreement.1 The decision is significant because the Third Circuit affirmed the Bankruptcy Court’s decision that the post-acceleration market value of the mortgage loans was not a relevant m

In a ruling that borrowers may try to use in seeking to delay foreclosures or bankruptcy proceedings on proofs of claim, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of New York finds that the Mortgage Electronic Registration System (MERS) lacks authority to assign mortgages.

On February 16, 2011, the Third Circuit affirmed a Delaware bankruptcy court's order determining the value of mortgage loans in the context of a 2006 repurchase agreement. Buyer Calyon argued that the mortgage loan portfolio sold to it by American Home Mortgage had a market price of only $670 million, as compared to its $1.15 billion contractual repurchase price, and that American Home Mortgage was required to pay Calyon the $480 million difference under a repo agreement.

On February 16, 2011, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ruled that a discounted cash flow analysis constituted “a commercially reasonable determinant[] of value” for purposes of section 562(a) of the United States Bankruptcy Code.1 In so doing, the court upheld the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware decision sustaining the objection of American Home Mortgage Holdings, Inc.

On February 10, 2011, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of New York issued a memorandum decision addressing whether the alleged holder of a mortgage loan had sufficient status as a secured creditor to seek relief from the automatic stay to pursue a foreclosure action.1 After resolving the primary issue in controversy on purely procedural grounds and granting the requested relief, the Court analyzed whether an entity that acquires its interest in a mortgage loan through an assignment from Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.

MERS’s authority to assign mortgages was called into question by a bankruptcy court in New York. In re Agard, 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 488 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2011). In response to the servicer’s motion for relief from the automatic stay, the debtor challenged the servicer’s standing on the ground that MERS lacked the authority to assign the mortgage to the servicer. Because a state court had previously entered a judgment of foreclosure and sale in favor of the servicer, the court was compelled by the Rooker Feldman doctrine to reject the debtor’s claims.