It has long been the law that creditors are rarely entitled to contractually prohibit a debtor from filing for bankruptcy, whether such restriction is contained in the debt instruments or in the corporate governance documents. In contrast, governance provisions which condition a bankruptcy filing on the vote or consent of certain equity holders that are unaffiliated with any creditor are frequently enforced. Many equity sponsors, for example, wear two hats: they are both shareholders and lenders to their portfolio companies.

Last week, President Trump unveiled his proposal to fix our nation’s aging infrastructure. While the proposal lauded $1.5 trillion in new spending, it only included $200 billion in federal funding. To bridge this sizable gap, the plan largely relies on public private partnerships (often referred to as P3s) that can use tax-exempt bond financing.

A recent opinion issued by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois reminds us that corporate veil-piercing liability is not exclusive to shareholders. Anyone who is in control of and misuses the corporate structure can be found liable for the obligations of the corporation. The facts of this case, however, did not support personal liability for veil-piecing.

Last week, the Working Group for the Fiscal and Economic Recovery of Puerto Rico gave the broadest hint yet of the next tactic in Puerto Rico’s ongoing quest to deleverage itself.  Although the details have not yet been articulated, Puerto Rico apparently proposes to blend into a single pot several types of distinct taxes currently earmarked to pay or support different types of bonds issued by a number of its legally separate municipal bond issuers, with the hope that the resulting concoction will meet the tastes of a sufficient number of its differing bond creditors to induce them to

Debtors must provide known creditors with actual notice of a claims bar date if they want the bar date to apply to those creditors. Such was the holding in In re Majorca Isles Master Association, Inc., Case No. 12-19056-AJC, Dkt. No. 222 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. March 27, 2014), where the bankruptcy court stated that when both a debtor and a creditor are “guilty in the handling of a claim and the [d]ebtor is aware of the creditor’s claim, then a tie goes to the creditor[,]” and the creditor’s claim will be allowed.

When a debtor rejects an executory contract, Section 365(n) of the Bankruptcy Code allows a licensee of intellectual property to retain certain rights under the rejected contract. An important question arises, therefore, whether a particular agreement indeed involves a license. In a recent decision, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has reaffirmed the definition of a license as “a mere waiver of the right to sue by the patentee.” In re Spansion, Inc., 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 26131, *7 (3d Cir. Dec. 21, 2012) (citing De Forest Radio Tel. & Tel. Co. v.

With the announcement today that the Swedish automaker Saab has filed for bankruptcy, we thought it timely to take a look at what happens to trademarks in the context of a bankruptcy proceeding.  SAAB is the owner of nearly 100 U.S.

In a decision that may have significant practical implications to the practice of bankruptcy law, the U.S. Supreme Court recently declared, on constitutional grounds, that a bankruptcy court cannot exercise jurisdiction over a debtor’s state law counterclaims, thus considerably limiting the ability of the bankruptcy court to fully and finally adjudicate claims in a bankruptcy case. Stern v. Marshall, No. 10-179 (June 23, 2011).

If a creditor is holding property of a party that files bankruptcy, is it “exercising control over” such property (and violating the automatic stay) by refusing the debtor’s turnover demands? According to the Supreme Court, the answer is no – instead, the stay under Section 362(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code only applies to affirmative acts that disturb the status quo as of the filing date. In other words, the mere retention of property of a debtor after the filing of a bankruptcy case does not violate the automatic stay.

In French v. Linn Energy, L.L.C. (In re Linn Energy, L.L.C.), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit addressed the scope of Bankruptcy Code Section 510(b), settling on an expansive reading of the Section, holding that a claim for “deemed dividends” should be subordinated.