The High Court gave its ruling yesterday in the case of Discover (Northampton) Limited and others v Debenhams Retail Limited and others [2019] EWHC 2441 (Ch), rejecting four of the five grounds on which the Applicants disputed the validity of the company's Creditors Voluntary Arrangement ("CVA"), which was approved by creditors in May 2019.

Both the First Energy Solutions and PG&E bankruptcies have seen proceedings regarding power purchase and similar agreements (PPAs) that raise this question.

Background

Contracts often contain provisions that enable a party to terminate or modify the contract based on the other party's bankruptcy filing, insolvency or deteriorating financial condition. In general, the Bankruptcy Code renders these types of provisions (sometimes referred to as "ipso facto" clauses) ineffective. Specifically, under section 365(e)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code (emphasis added):

Within German contract law, the principle of being bound by a contract (pacta sunt servanda), i.e. the obligation to fulfill agreements, applies. In case of the insolvency of one of the contractual parties, however, exceptions are made. Upon the opening of the insolvency proceedings, the principle of being bound by a contract is modified. 

Merit Management Group, LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc., No. 16-784

Section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 546(e), protects certain prepetition payouts by or to financial institutions from clawback by the trustee of the ensuing bankruptcy estate. In particular, the safe harbor protects transfers made by a debtor by or to a broker, financial institution, or similar intermediary in connection with a “securities contract,” unless the transfer was made with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors.

The insolvency challenge rights give the insolvency administrator, under certain prerequisites, access to assets which the debtor disposed of to the detriment of the creditors prior to the filing for insolvency, thus increasing the insolvency estate.

In Re DTEK Finance BV,¹ the English High Court decided that a change in the governing law of bonds from New York to English law, established a sufficient connection with the English jurisdiction for it to sanction the bonds' restructuring via a UK scheme of arrangement.

Background

INTRODUCTION

On 7 January 2014 the Financial Services and Treasury Bureau of the Hong Kong Government (FSTB), in conjunction with the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA), Securities and Futures Commission (SFC) and the Insurance Authority (IA), issued a first stage consultation regarding the introduction of a resolution regime for financial institutions in Hong Kong (the “Consultation”). The Consultation initiates a discussion as to the regulatory structure and principles that would be required to establish an effective resolution regime for financial institutions in Hong Kong.

In The Joint and Several Liquidators of QQ Club Limited (in liquidation) v. Golden Year Limited (HCCW 245/2011, 9 April 2013) (QQ Club), the Court of First Instance held that a liquidator's costs in pursuing an avoidance claim are "fees and expenses properly incurred in preserving, realizing or getting in the assets", and are payable out of the company's assets in priority to all other payments prescribed in rule 179 of the Companies (Winding-up) Rules. In reaching this conclusion, the court distinguished the English Court of Appeal's decision in Lewis v.

A facilitation payment to encourage creditors to vote through the restructuring proposals of creditors’ debts has been held by the High Court not to be an illegal bribe. The court had regard to the fact that the offer of payment was made openly to all relevant creditors, none of whom were prevented from voting on the proposal. As such, where a creditor consented and received the facilitation payment, this was not contrary to the pari passu principle.

The facts