In today’s difficult economic environment, it is vital for trade vendors faced with customers’ bankruptcies to have optimal strategies for collecting invoices for past shipments and protecting prior payments from being clawed back by a bankruptcy estate as preferences. The need for such strategies will only increase as record amounts of corporate debt mature. Nelson D. Schwartz, Corporate Debt Coming Due May Squeeze Credit, N.Y.

federal court in New York has dismissed as moot an appeal filed by plaintiffs with products liability claims pending against General Motors Corp. (GM) before it was sold in bankruptcy. In re: Motors Liquidation Co., No. 09 Civ. 6818 (U.S. Dist. Ct., S.D.N.Y., decided April 13, 2010). The plaintiffs sought to overturn a bankruptcy court’s approval of the automaker’s sale “free and clear” of their existing products liability claims as well as any successor liability claims they may have against the “new” GM.

IN RE: ALTHEIMER & GRAY (April 15, 2010)

On April 26th, the Eleventh Circuit held that the anti-injunction provision of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act prohibits a federal district court from enjoining the FDIC. A trial court had initially imposed a TRO against a failing bank prohibiting it from taking any action with respect to $1 billion worth of mortgage proceeds it held in trust for petitioner, Bank of America, who held legal title. When the FDIC was appointed receiver, the FDIC moved to dissolve the TRO. The trial court refused converting the TRO into a preliminary injunction.

A recent Delaware bankruptcy court decision1 on the ability of “bankruptcy remote” single-purpose entities emphasizes the complicated nature of the bankruptcy process and the issues that need to be considered when using “bankruptcy remote” entities in funding structures. Given the prevalence of such entities, this is an important decision for all participants in the structured fi nance industry.

In In re Kohls, 2007 LEXIS 76 (Bankr NDWVa 2007), the debtor filed this adversary proceeding against the Bank to cancel indebtedness and recover damages related to a $34,864 loan that the Bank made to the Debtor on the grounds that the loan was unconscionable at the time it was executed in violation of W. Va. Code § 46A-2-121.

Credit bidding has become a really hot issue recently. For those of us who don't normally work on bankruptcy matters, the right to credit bid is an important right that secured lenders usually have in a bankruptcy proceeding. If you're the senior secured lender and you want to buy the company's assets in a bankruptcy sale, you can show up at the auction and, instead of bidding cash, you can place credit bids.

Many bankruptcy practitioners are familiar with the general tenet that an obligation secured only by a mortgage on the Debtor’s principal residence is immune from modification or avoidance by the Debtor. Sections 1123(b)(5) and 1322(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code protect residential mortgages from being “stripped-down” to the value of the subject real estate or subjecting the terms of the underlying obligation to modification.

On May 5, 2010, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York issued a decision declaring that a party’s right to setoff in an ISDA Master Agreement is unenforceable in bankruptcy unless strict mutuality exists. (Decision and Order).

A bankruptcy court recently held that in order for a supplier of goods on credit to establish an administrative claim under Bankruptcy Code section 503(b)(9) in the bankruptcy case of its buyer, the supplier will need to show that its buyer "physically" received the goods within 20 days prior to the buyer's bankruptcy filing, regardless of when title to the goods passed. In Re Circuit City Stores, Inc., et al., Case No. 08-35653, No. 7149 (Bankr. E.D. VA April 8, 2010).