The recent case of F Options Ltd v Prestwood Properties Ltd concerned the setting aside of a transaction as a preference under section 239 of the Insolvency Act 1986.

A preference arises when a company's creditor is put in a better position than they would otherwise have been in the event of the company's insolvency. Transactions may be a preference whether or not the parties are connected, but where it can be shown that there is a connection within section 249 of the Insolvency Act 1986, two important advantages are gained:

The law allows any person to be treated as a director even though that person has not been formally appointed as a director. Such directors are known as de-facto directors. By contrast, a de jure director is a person who has been validly appointed as a director.

The recent case of Re Snelling House Ltd (In Liquidation) [2012] EWHC 440 (Ch) serves as a useful reminder to consider possible claims against de-facto directors who may be acting under the wrong impression that they are beyond reprehension.

The facts

BESTrustees v Kaupthing Singer & Friedlander [2012] EWHC 629 (Ch) (High Court Chancery Division 16 March 2012)

Background

The court will unravel a transaction where it appears to have been entered into to place assets beyond the reach of creditors.

This was the case in Ambrose sub nom Garwood v Amborse & Ambrose, where the trustee in bankruptcy of Mr Ambrose applied for declaratory relief and an order for the possession and sale of Mr & Mrs Ambrose's property.

Key points

• The High Court has ruled that, where a tenant goes into administration, rent which is payable in advance and falls due before the commencement of the administration is not recoverable by the landlord as an administration expense
• Landlords must take their place with other unsecured creditors in relation to sums payable before the appointment of administrators, even if they relate to a period during which the administrators had use of the property

Background

Just a short post to update our previous post on the issue of administrators being obliged to pay rent as an expense of the administration. 

The long awaited judgment in The Commissioners for her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs v. Football League Limited, on the so called “football creditors’ rule” (the “Rule”) has been given.

This article only concerns itself with the issue of whether the Rule was or was not considered void on the grounds that it was contrary to the pari passu principle and the anti-deprivation rule and not on the fairness of the Rule itself.

An administrator who was sued in relation to contractual liabilities which he entered as administrator of a company was found to have no personal liability for those contracts or for the costs of the litigation.

In the recent case of Wright Hassall LLP v Morris¹ the claimant advanced various arguments in an attempt to make the administrator personally liable for a costs order in litigation where the defendant companies were unable to pay. These arguments were rejected.

The Supreme Court decides how client moneys are to be allocated in the Lehman estate, which has far-reaching implications for distributions in other financial collapses.

The Supreme Court has recently handed down a decision in a contentious and difficult application in the Lehman administration, a decision which fundamentally affects the allocation of client moneys in the Lehman estate.

A facilitation payment to encourage creditors to vote through the restructuring proposals of creditors’ debts has been held by the High Court not to be an illegal bribe. The court had regard to the fact that the offer of payment was made openly to all relevant creditors, none of whom were prevented from voting on the proposal. As such, where a creditor consented and received the facilitation payment, this was not contrary to the pari passu principle.

The facts