Before soliciting votes on its bankruptcy plan, a chapter 11 debtor that has filed for bankruptcy typically must obtain court approval of its disclosure statement. As part of the disclosure-statement approval process, interested parties are afforded the opportunity to object. For example, a party may object on the grounds that the disclosure statement lacks sufficient information about the debtor. Sometimes, however, a party objects to the disclosure statement because the chapter 11 plan described by the statement cannot be confirmed.
This week, Edward Gavin, the liquidating trustee (the "Trustee") for the Ultimate Escapes bankruptcy, filed preference complaints against several defendants. Under the complaints, the Trustee alleges that the defendants received preferential transfers that are avoidable under 11 U.S.C. section 547 of the Bankruptcy Code. For those unfamiliar with this bankruptcy proceeding, Ultimate Escapes ("Ultimate" or the "Debtor") filed petitions for bankruptcy in the Delaware Bankruptcy Court on September 20, 2010.
In In reAm. Capital Equip., LLC1 the Third Circuit addressed the issue of whether a bankruptcy court has the authority to determine at the disclosure statement stage that a Chapter 11 plan is unconfirmable without holding a confirmation hearing. The court held that when a plan is patently unconfirmable, so that no dispute of material fact remains and defects cannot be cured by creditor voting, a bankruptcy court is authorized to convert the case to Chapter 7 without holding a confirmation hearing. Am.
As the seventh anniversary of the enactment of chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code draws near, the volume of chapter 15 cases commenced in U.S. bankruptcy courts on behalf of foreign debtors has increased rapidly. During that period, there has also (understandably) been a marked uptick in litigation concerning various aspects of the comparatively new legislative regime governing cross-border bankruptcy cases patterned on the Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency. One such issue was the subject of a ruling recently handed down by a Texas district court. In In re Vitro, S.A.B. de C.V., 470 B.R.
In response to the July 2, 2012 Order of Rehabilitation, and an anticipated Order of Liquidation, against Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Company and American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Company (collectively, “Lumbermens”),1 we have prepared the following “frequently asked questions” guide summarizing issues related to: (i) the financial regulation of insurance companies; (ii) the liquidation and proof of claim process in Illinois; (iii) potential recovery by policyholders of the amount of “covered” workers’ compensation claims from state guaranty associations; (iv) policyh
On March 15, 2012, the American Bar Association’s Electronic Discovery (ESI) in Bankruptcy Working Group (the “Working Group”) published an interim report addressing certain principles and suggested best practices for electronic discovery in bankruptcy cases (the “Interim Report”). The Working Group was formed to study and prepare guidelines or a “best practices” report on the scope and timing of a party’s obligation to preserve ESI in bankruptcy cases.
The Supreme Court has cleared the way for Irving Picard, the Trustee overseeing the Madoff liquidation proceeding, to distribute billions of dollars to victims of Madoff’s Ponzi scheme. On Monday, the Court declined to hear appeals in two cases from the Second Circuit challenging Picard’s formula for repaying victims.
Baker Hostetler serves as court-appointed counsel to Irving H. Picard, SIPA Trustee for the liquidation of Bernard L. Madoff Securities LLC (“BLMIS”). In January of 2011, the SIPA Trustee obtained approval from the United States Bankruptcy Court for a $5 billion settlement for BLMIS customers with allowed claims. At the same time, the Bankruptcy Court also issued a permanent injunction with respect to claims that were duplicative or derivative of the SIPA Trustee’s claims. After an appeal, the District Court affirmed the settlement and the injunction in March of 2012.
In a unanimous decision, the U.S. Supreme Court held that debtors may not obtain confirmation of a Chapter 11 cramdown plan that provides for the sale of collateral free and clear of a creditor’s lien but does not permit the creditor to credit-bid at the sale. InRadlax Gateway Hotel, LLC et al. v.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently issued an important decision on the valuation of collateral of secured creditors and “lien-stripping” in Chapter 11 cases. In In re Heritage Highgate, Inc.,1 the court held that in a Chapter 11 case, the value of a secured creditor’s collateral under §506(a) of the Bankruptcy Code2 was the fair market value of the property as established by expert testimony and it was permissible to “strip the lien” of the creditor where it was unsupported by collateral value.