In a three-line order, the Delaware Supreme Court recently affirmed the Court of Chancery’s dismissal of a suit by a creditor against Athilon Capital Corp. and its sole shareholder, Merced Capital Partners, arising from claims of self-interested transactions by Merced. Quadrant Structured Products Company, Ltd. v. Vertin serves as a reminder of the limited recourse of creditors against controlling shareholders of a debtor that is solvent, even in the cases of egregious conduct.
The Facts
Section 316(b) of the Trust Indenture Act, which prohibits action that would deprive individual bondholders of the right to receive principal and interest, has taken center stage of late with rulings on the scope of its applicability. But another provision of Section 316 of the TIA drives in the opposite direction, and is equally fundamental to the architecture of indenture debt as commonly issued in this country. Section 316(a)(1) prescribes the default rule that a majority of bondholders have the power to direct the remedial actions of the trustee.
As many investors anticipated, the deep trough in the commodities market over recent years resulted in a number of companies in commodity industries restructuring their balance sheets through a Chapter 11 bankruptcy process. Because companies often reorganize in the midst of a market downturn, a commodity company’s low EBITDA during this time usually results in low values being placed on the company’s reorganized equity.
In an August 2016 decision in the Aéropostale bankruptcy case,1 the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York held that allegations of insider trading did not justify equitable subordination and were not “cause” to deny a credit bid. The decision helps bridge the gap between the treatment of insider trading allegations in bankruptcy court and their treatment everywhere else.
Rated and other debt issuances are often structured with borrowers that are special purpose entities, whose governance provisions are designed to inhibit bankruptcy filings. A recent District of Delaware bankruptcy court case, while not directly on point, throws into question the premises underlying the efficacy of such provisions.
Facts
A recent decision by an appeals court of the State of New York highlights the deceptive complexity of bringing non-contractual claims by or on behalf of noteholders under the seemingly boilerplate remedies provisions in trust indentures. At issue was the standard indenture language that defines the authority of a trustee to bring claims under the indenture, and in particular whether the trustee has the power to bring non-contractual claims under its own volition (not directed by a majority in principal amount of bondholders) against persons not party to the indenture.
A recent decision from the Southern District of New York may reopen a door — which many had believed was all but closed — for disgruntled creditors seeking to challenge failed leveraged buyouts (“LBOs”) as fraudulent conveyances. In In re Lyondell Chemical Co., 2016 WL 4030937 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 2016), District Judge Denise Cote reinstated an intentional fraudulent conveyance claim seeking to claw back $6.3 billion in distributions made to Lyondell Chemical’s shareholders through an LBO that failed quickly and dramatically.
On June 28, 2016, Judge Chapman of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York ruled in Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc. v. Bank of America National Association, et al.(Adv. Proc. No. 10-03547 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
The Third Circuit recently affirmed that a debtor in Chapter 11 can use a tender offer to settle claims without running afoul of the Bankruptcy Code. Although In re Energy Future Holdings Corp.is limited to its particular facts and circumstances, the decision could lead to increased use of tender offers prior to confirmation of a bankruptcy plan.
Several recent cases in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York have created ambiguity about when distressed exchange offers violate Section 316(b) of the 1939 Trust Indenture Act (the “TIA”). It appears that plaintiffs’ lawyers are using this ambiguity to challenge distressed exchange offers. The threat of litigation may give minority bondholders a powerful tool to hinder less than fully consensual out-of-court restructurings and provide them with increased leverage in negotiations.