Preference avoidance provisions are a crucial part of the Bankruptcy Code—contained, primarily, in § 547 & § 550.

States also have a preference avoidance statute—for insiders. It’s in the Uniform Voidable Transactions Act (“UVTA)” or in its predecessor, the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (“UFTA)).

The insider preference statute appears to be rarely-used and, apparently, little-known. It reads like this:

2022 has been a bad year for the Carolina Panthers of the National Football League:

A bankruptcy discharge “does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt– . . . for fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity.” 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4).

The effect of this “fiduciary capacity” statute is newly before the U.S. Supreme Court on a petition for certiorari in Spring Valley Produce, Inc. v. Forrest, Case No. 22-502.

The question presented in Spring Valley is this:

Assignments for benefit of creditors (“ABC”) are rarely used in these United States. That’s for two reasons: (i) some states have no ABC statute and do not recognize the common law of ABCs, and (ii) other states have onerous ABC statutes that no one wants to use.

The State of Illinois is an exception: ABCs are regularly and frequently used there, under the common law of trusts, because the ABC process is an efficient and effective tool for liquidating a failed or failing business. There is no ABC statute in Illinois.

Every now and then we get a bankruptcy opinion declaring a rule with broad application that, (i) may make sense is specific situations, but (ii) is a terrible result for others.

Here’s an Exhibit A opinion for such a proposition: Reinhart Foodservice LLC v. Schlundt, Case No. 21-cv-1027 in the U.S. District Court for Eastern Wisconsin, (Doc. 12, issued October 27, 2022).

The Facts

Poor Chicago. 

Unlike the result for Chicago’s traffic ticket income in Fulton v. Chicago, the U.S. Supreme Court refuses to rescue Chicago in City of Chicago v. Mance (Case No. 22-268; Cert. denied, 11/21/2022).[Fn. 1]

Four decades and several years ago, Congress repeals the Federal Bankruptcy Act of 1898 and replaces it with the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, aka the “Bankruptcy Code.”[Fn. 1]

A decade later, Justices on the U.S. Supreme Court are still disparaging the new Bankruptcy Code as the “sweeping changes Congress instituted in 1978” and “the radical reforms of 1978.”[Fn. 2]

Every now and then we get an example of how a process should work.

That’s exactly what we have, regarding confirmation of a contested Subchapter V plan, in the case of In re Lapeer Aviation, Inc., Case No. 21-31500 in the Eastern Michigan Bankruptcy Court.

In an opinion issued October 12, 2022, (Doc. 264), the Lapeer Court declares that, (i) most of the plan confirmation standards are satisfied, but (ii) the plan is deficient under two confirmation standards and, therefore, cannot be confirmed.

During a November 9, 2022, hearing on summary judgment motions in the Hertz bankruptcy, Delaware Bankruptcy Judge Mary F. Walrath issues the following oral ruling:

The case is Wells v. McCallister, Case No. 21-1448 in the United States Supreme Court.

The question presented is:

• whether a debtor’s homestead exemption, existing on the date of bankruptcy filing, can vanish if the debtor sells the homestead during the bankruptcy and does not promptly reinvest the proceeds in another homestead.

The Petition for writ of certiorari explains: